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F O R E W O R D
Around the world societies and governments are confronting new challenges to old thinking about 
the elderly and retirement. Rapid advances in medicine, diet, and living standards have increased life
expectancy in both the developed and developing worlds. Economic “miracles” have transformed many
societies by creating robust and growing urban middle classes where rural poverty was the norm only 
a few generations ago. In country after country, this remarkable story is the same. Governments that had
been focused on the social impact of their productive workers dying too young now are worried about
those workers rapidly approaching retirement years and living too long—past the ability of their families,
their savings, or their government systems to provide for them.
In many ways Korea is one of the world’s most extreme examples of these demographic challenges. 
Its story is one of the most inspiring and at the same time its coming challenges will be some of the
most daunting. As outlined in this policy discussion, Korea’s meteoric economic growth and health-care
advances have positively altered the fabric of Korean society. But as a consequence, Korea faces the chal-
lenge of providing for one of the most rapidly aging populations on the planet. This calls for unique solu-
tions distinct from what has been suggested in markets like the United States, Europe, Japan, or China.
MetLife is proud to have sponsored this important report by the Center for Strategic and International
Studies. The report offers a detailed exploration of Korea’s demographic challenges and outlines CSIS’
creative ideas to meet them. As an established leader in the retirement market, and a company actively
engaged in public policy forums, MetLife has long been at the forefront in advocating meaningful reform
in the pension and retirement arena in the United States. MetLife believes it has a responsibility to
advance the dialogue about these challenges wherever it does business. We do not have all the answers.
No one does. But by engaging resources such as CSIS and others to investigate the challenges and to
suggest solutions, the answers can be found through constructive informed dialogue among experts
from many areas. We can observe what is tried in one part of the world and learn from 
each other’s experience.
This report is important but not definitive. From MetLife’s perspective, the single most powerful 
tool in meeting the needs of aging populations and mitigating longevity risk is the pooling of 
those risks. The mechanism of using mortality pools to balance the needs of aging societies to fund
longer-lived populations will be fundamental to solving many different nations’ demographic challenges.
Working with academics, business, and governmental partners to address these challenges will also be
fundamental—again pooling, in this case a pooling of intellectual capital. It’s our hope that this type of
research will stimulate a dialogue that can bring together the best minds and the best ideas to meet
Korea’s challenges and to help inform Korea’s choices for tomorrow.
C. Robert Henrikson
Chairman of the Board, President & Chief Executive Officer of MetLife, Inc.
Korea is still a demographically youthful nation.1 In 2005, the
elderly made up just 9 percent of the population, far beneath
the developed-country average of 15 percent. But with life
expectancy rising and birthrates plumbing record lows, Korea
is about to undergo a stunning demographic transformation.
According to the latest government projections, 38 percent 
of Korea’s population will be elderly by 2050, putting it in 
contention with Japan, Italy, and Spain for the oldest country
on earth.2 (See Figure 1.)
KOREA TODAY IS A DEMOGRAPHICALLY
YOUNG NATION, BUT BY 2050 IT MAY BE 
THE OLDEST COUNTRY ON EARTH.
The aging of its population will bring profound changes to 
nearly every dimension of Korean life. Government budgets will
come under relentless pressure from rising expenditures on pen-
sions and health care. Businesses will have to cope with a deficit
of entry-level workers and young consumers, while families will
have to cope with a surplus of frail elders. Unless Korea takes
adequate and timely steps to prepare, it could face a future 
of slower economic growth and stagnating living standards. 
KOREA MUST CONFRONT THE AGING 
OF ITS POPULATION WHILE IT IS STILL IN 
THE MIDST OF MODERNIZATION.
Populations are of course aging throughout the world. 
The challenge facing Korea, however, is especially daunting.
Quite simply, no other society at a similar stage of develop-
ment faces an age wave that is as massive as Korea’s—or as
fast approaching. Unlike China, which is also aging rapidly,
Korea is already a high-income society in which most citizens,
including most elders, have grown accustomed to middle-class
living standards. Yet unlike Japan, the United States, and
Europe, Korea must confront the aging of its population 
while it is still in the midst of modernization.
The overlap of rapid aging and rapid development in Korea
creates a unique set of challenges. Despite the breathtaking
economic growth of recent decades, Korea in many ways
remains a traditional society with a traditional understanding
of social roles. Workers are expected to retire early from 
formal employment. The elderly are expected to live with 
and be supported by their extended families. Women who
I N T R O D U C T I O N
1 Korea in this report always refers to the Republic of Korea (or South Korea), unless otherwise noted.
2 All population projections for Korea cited in this report refer to the Korea National Statistical Office’s 2006 baseline scenario. The KNSO projections, as well as all other major sources
for data on Korea’s population, economy, and retirement system, are discussed in the Note on Data and Sources at the end of the report.
marry are expected to quit their jobs. Some of these traditions
pose a problem for a rapidly aging Korea because they are 
still so strong. The culture of early retirement, for example,
increases the burden of elder dependency, while the marriage
job trade-off facing women pulls down the fertility rate. Other
traditions pose a problem because they are weakening and
Korea has not yet devised effective modern substitutes for
them. The share of elders living with their grown children is
already declining rapidly, but Korea’s National Pension System
(NPS) does not yet protect most dependent elders living alone.
Most Koreans assume that the growing vulnerability of the
elderly is a near-term problem that will eventually correct itself
when the NPS, which was established less than two decades
ago, matures and begins to pay out full pensions to millions 
of elders. But in fact, the problem is likely to be enduring. 
NPS benefit levels will be much less generous than most
Koreans assume—and because the system leaves a large 
share of the workforce uncovered, a large share of the elderly,
perhaps one-third, may still be without any public pension at
all even a half century from now.
Yet at the same time, so massive is Korea’s impending age
wave that the cost of the NPS will still grow explosively, from
just 0.4 percent of GDP in 2005 to 7.3 percent of GDP by
2050. If the government were to fill in all the benefit and 
coverage gaps, the cost would rise much further—to 
13.9 percent of GDP. Including health care and other pro-
grams, the total cost of benefits to the elderly could easily
exceed 25 percent of GDP by 2050. Retirement strategy in
Korea is therefore caught on the horns of a dilemma. How
does one reform a system whose coverage and benefits are
inadequate and yet whose ultimate cost is unaffordable?
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4Some might suppose that faster economic growth could 
make the future burden manageable. The problem is that
growth in an aging Korea is almost certain to slow as the
number of workers shrinks, as their average age rises, and as
national savings declines. Others might suppose that eventual
reunification of an aging South Korea with a younger North
Korea could alter the old-age dependency equation. But in 
the near term, any economic benefit to the South from the
North’s more abundant youth would be overwhelmed by the
economic cost of reunification with a country whose per capita
income is less than one-tenth of its own. In the long term, 
living standards in the North would rise—and as they do, 
the demographics of the two Koreas would converge.
Reunification may be an important policy goal, but it is 
not a solution to the aging challenge.
Still others hope that higher birthrates and longer work 
lives may change the demographic and fiscal projections 
in Korea’s favor. While this is possible, moving Korea in this 
direction will require sweeping changes in social institutions
and attitudes. This too must be part of Korea’s overall strategy
for confronting its age wave. To prepare for the coming demo-
graphic transformation, Korea will not only have to reform its
retirement system, but also realign traditional social norms
with the needs of a fast-developing and fast-aging society.
KOREA’S LEADERS HAVE BEGUN TO 
GRAPPLE WITH THE AGING CHALLENGE.
Over the past few years, Korea’s leaders have begun to grap-
ple with the aging challenge. The Presidential Committee on
Aging Society and Population Policy has published a long-term
future scan called “Vision 2020” that outlines broad strategic
goals, from raising retirement ages to raising fertility rates. 
In August 2006, it also issued a “five-year aging plan” that
includes concrete measures, from subsidies for companies that
hire or retain older workers to subsidies for families to help pay
for day care and education. While most experts agree that the
measures fall far short of a complete solution, they send the
right signal and push in the right direction. The government’s
decision to make higher fertility an explicit policy goal is espe-
cially significant and represents a dramatic reversal of decades
of restrictive family planning policy.
The government is also trying to reform the retirement system
and strengthen the old-age safety net. It recently proposed
increasing means-tested assistance for the low-income elderly
and will soon begin phasing in a new long-term care program.
It has also begun to lay the groundwork for a new corporate
pension system that could greatly improve the future retire-
ment income prospects of middle-income elders.
DESPITE THE PROGRESS, KOREA’S 
RETIREMENT SYSTEM REMAINS ON AN 
UNSUSTAINABLE COURSE.
Despite the progress, however, Korea’s retirement system
remains on an unsustainable course. Although the govern-
ment is trying to expand coverage under the NPS, as of 2005
just 65 percent of the labor force actually contributed to the
system or one of the special government pension plans for
government employees, private school teachers, and the
armed forces. As for the future cost burden, the government
enacted a major reform in 1998 that raised NPS contributions
and reduced promised benefits in an effort to close the 
system’s long-term deficit—and the National Assembly is 
now considering a second reform that would raise contribu-
tions and reduce benefits again. While the system’s long-term
deficit needs to be closed, the benefit cuts are undermining 
its adequacy. What’s worse, even if the reform now under 
consideration in the National Assembly is passed, it would 
still leave the NPS facing long-term insolvency.
This report turns the spotlight on Korea’s efforts to grapple
with its aging challenge. The first chapter looks more closely at
the underlying demographic trends and their long-term fiscal,
economic, and social implications. The second chapter
describes the contours of Korea’s retirement system, both 
public and private, and suggests a possible reform strategy.
The third chapter looks at broader trends—in the labor 
market, in the family, and in the society at large—that may
help or hinder a successful response to the aging challenge.
A conclusion then briefly summarizes the report’s conclusions
and discusses the prospects for reform.
THE CENTRAL CHALLENGE FOR AN AGING
KOREA IS HOW TO PROVIDE A DECENT 
LEVEL OF SUPPORT FOR THE OLD WITHOUT 
OVERBURDENING THE YOUNG.
The central challenge for an aging Korea is how to provide 
a decent level of support for the old without imposing a 
5crushing burden on the young. This report argues that the 
current retirement system must be fundamentally restructured
to meet these twin goals. It recommends a three-step reform
strategy: creating a universal floor of old-age poverty protec-
tion that would be financed through general government 
revenues, transforming the NPS by combining it with a 
mandatory system of fully funded “add-on” personal
accounts, and expanding supplementary employer pensions.
A FULLY FUNDED RETIREMENT SYSTEM 
WOULD ALLOW KOREA TO ESCAPE THE
TYRANNY OF ITS OWN DEMOGRAPHY.
The case for full funding is compelling. At the macro level, 
fully funded pensions help to maintain adequate rates of sav-
ings and investment, which is one of the greatest challenges
facing an aging Korea. At the micro level, they offer higher
returns, and hence higher benefits, at any given contribution
rate than a pay-as-you-go system can. There are other advan-
tages as well. A fully funded retirement system would help
broaden and deepen Korea’s capital markets. It would also
allow an aging Korea to escape the tyranny of its own demog-
raphy. In pay-as-you-go systems, benefits are ultimately deter-
mined by national population and productivity growth. In fully
funded systems, workers and retirees in aging and slowly
growing economies are able to invest their savings in younger
and faster growing economies around the world.
The good news is that Korea still has time to prepare for 
the aging of its population. For the next 10 to 15 years, 
it will continue to enjoy the benefits of a youthful population
and a growing workforce. Along with this demographic 
window of opportunity, Korea also has an economic and 
political window. While the immaturity of Korea’s National
Pension System poses real challenges, it also confers an 
important advantage. Most fast-aging developed countries 
are burdened by enormous unfunded benefit liabilities that
raise the economic and political costs of reform. Korea, 
precisely because its welfare state is so new, can more easily
change course. 
Back in the 1960s, Korea set out to transform itself from 
an impoverished agrarian society into a world-class economic
power—and successfully harnessed its national will and
national resources to the task. Now the aging of its population
confronts Korea with a challenge that is every bit as great.
Although meeting the challenge will not be easy, few who
know Korea doubt that the Land of the Morning Calm will 
be up to the task.
UNLIKE MOST
DEVELOPED
COUNTRIES, 
KOREA STILL
HAS TIME 
TO PREPARE
FOR THE
AGING OF ITS 
POPULATION
T H E  
D E M O G R A P H I C S
A N D  E C O N O M I C S
O F  A N  A G I N G
K O R E A
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Forty-five years ago in 1960, there were 18 Koreans under 
age 20 for every one Korean aged 65 or older. By 2050, there
will be three Koreans aged 65 and over for every one Korean
child. A generation ago, the problem was too many babies. 
A generation from now, it will be too many old people.
BY 2050, THERE WILL BE THREE ELDERLY
KOREANS FOR EVERY KOREAN CHILD.
What makes Korea’s age wave so challenging is not just its
magnitude, but the blistering pace of the demographic trans-
formation. The United Nations somewhat arbitrarily defines an
“aging society” as one in which the elderly make up at least 
7 percent of the population and an “aged society” as one in
which they make up at least 14 percent. Korea passed the first
threshold in 2000 and is due to pass the second in 2018—just
18 years later. It took France (starting in 1864) 115 years to
complete this transition. It will take the United States (starting
in 1942) 71 years. Even Japan, legendary for the rapidity of its
aging, required (starting in 1970) 24 years. (See Figure 2.)
The United Nations also defines a “super-aged society” as 
one in which the elderly make up at least 20 percent of the
population. Korea is expected to reach that milestone in 2026,
just eight years further into the future—again, faster than 
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any other nation either in the past or projected future. By
2050, Korea’s elder share is projected to reach 38 percent, 
surpassing milestones for which the United Nations has yet 
to invent a name.
THE DEMOGRAPHICS OF KOREA’S AGE WAVE
Korea’s demographic transformation, like similar transforma-
tions underway in other aging societies around the world, 
is the outcome of two fundamental forces—falling fertility 
and rising longevity. The first is decreasing the relative number
of young in the population, while the second is increasing 
the relative number of old.
KOREA’S FERTILITY RATE 
IS NOW JUST 1.1—THE LOWEST LEVEL 
IN THE WORLD.
Korea’s fertility rate has fallen precipitously since the first 
five-year economic plan launched the nation on its develop-
ment odyssey. Back in 1960, Korean women on average gave
birth to 6.0 children. By 1983, the fertility rate had fallen to
2.1—the so-called replacement rate needed to keep the 
population from shrinking from one generation to the next.
After stabilizing briefly at between 1.5 and 1.7 from the 
mid-1980s to the mid-1990s, it resumed its decline, 
plummeting all the way to 1.1 in 2006, the lowest level 
today of any country in the world. (See Figure 3.) Even as 
fertility rates have fallen, improved nutrition, sanitation, and
health care have led to large increases in life expectancy. 
Since the Korean War, life expectancy at birth has risen by 
a breathtaking 29 years. In 2005, it stood at 78.6, higher 
than life expectancy in the United States and not far behind
Japan, the world leader. (See Figure 4.)
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Behind Korea's age wave: A dramatic decline in fertility. 
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In the early 1960s, Korea was a country haunted by the
specter of overpopulation. With mortality rates falling rapidly,
continued high fertility threatened to lead to runaway 
population growth and leave the country mired in poverty.
Chunghee Park, the authoritarian president who master-
minded Korea’s economic development during the 1960s 
and 1970s, set out to lower the birthrate as part of an overall
strategy to slow population growth and raise per capita living
standards. The state set targets—a three-child family in 1968,
a two-child family in 1971, and a one or two-child family 
in the early 1980s—and backed them up with economic
incentives and a relentless public relations campaign. As
recently as the 1980s, government slogans proclaimed that
“even two are a lot” and “one child per family and our 
land still overflows with people.”
At the time, no one anticipated that fertility would sink to 
the replacement rate within a generation—much less fall far
beneath it. Few believed that government anti-natal policies,
combined with the impact of rural-urban migration, industrial-
ization, rising educational attainment, and the changing role 
of women, would be so effective. Nor did anyone give much
thought to the inevitable sequel to below-replacement 
fertility—the eventual dramatic aging of Korea’s population
and the fiscal, economic, and social challenges it would 
pose. The specter now haunting Korea—surging old-age
dependency costs and a shrinking and graying workforce—
was over the horizon and off the radar.
BY 2050, NEARLY TWO IN EVERY FIVE
KOREANS WILL BE AGED 65 OR OLDER.
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That once far-off future is now rapidly approaching. About 
10 years from now, Korea’s outsized “baby boom” cohorts,
born in the 1950s and 1960s before fertility rates plunged, 
will begin to reach the threshold of old age. As they do, 
the number of elderly will surge. Just 9 percent of Koreans 
are aged 65 and over today. That share is projected to rise
gradually to 13 percent in 2015—then leap to 24 percent 
by 2030 and 38 percent by 2050. By 2050, the median age 
of the Korean population is projected to be 57, nearly twice
what it is today and three times what it was in 1960. By 
then, the projected number of Koreans aged 85 and over 
(3.4 million) will nearly equal the number of children under
age 15 (3.8 million).
KOREA IS ON TRACK TO LOSE A 
THIRD OF ITS WORKING-AGE 
POPULATION BY MID-CENTURY.
Meanwhile, Korea’s workforce and population will enter a
gathering decline. Korea’s child population already peaked 
in 1974 and has since shrunk by 31 percent. The working-age
population, which is still experiencing moderate growth, is 
due to peak in 2018 and decline thereafter. By 2050, there 
will be 34 percent fewer Koreans aged 20 to 64 than there 
are today. Excluding adults in their fifties and early sixties,
whose numbers are still growing rapidly, the projected 
decline is much larger. (See Figure 5.) Korea’s total population
is also due to peak in 2018, the same year as its working-age
population. The decline in the total population will initially be
more gradual, since the number of elders will still be rising. 
But after mid-century, it will accelerate as well. By the year
2100, unless fertility rises, Korea is on track to lose more 
than half of its current population.
Such dramatic projections raise an obvious question: Do the
underlying assumptions overstate the likely magnitude of the
coming wave? We believe that the answer is no. The official
government demographic projections used in this report 
conservatively assume that the rate of improvement in Korean
life expectancy will slow in the future, despite the enormous
potential of biomedicine to extend the human life span. 
They also assume that Korea’s fertility rate, which has been 
in almost continuous decline for half a century, will gradually
rise to 1.3, significantly above today’s level. 
Some demographers point out that today’s new generation 
of young Korean women are delaying marriage and child-
birth—and conclude that the fertility rate is therefore bound 
to rise over time. This timing or cohort effect may well be real. 
While the decline in fertility was driven primarily by a decline 
in marital fertility up to 1990, since then it has been driven by
the rapid rise in the age of marriage—from 24.8 to 27.7 for
women over the last 15 years. It is reasonable to suppose that
these women will recoup in their thirties some of the babies
they didn’t have in their twenties. Yet the projections already
build in a substantial cohort effect. Age-specific fertility rates 
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among women aged 30 to 34 are assumed to rise by 
20 percent and among those aged 35 to 39 to triple. These
assumptions explain the projected rise in the fertility rate 
from today’s 1.1 to 1.3.
While a larger rise in fertility is certainly possible, Korea 
cannot count on it. Although the government’s family 
planning policies helped initiate the slide in fertility rates back
in the 1960s and 1970s, the slide would surely have occurred
even in their absence. It has been observed in nearly all 
modern societies that have experienced rising incomes, the
growing educational attainment and economic emancipation
of women, and the widespread availability of effective contra-
ception and abortion. It is called the “demographic transition.”
In Korea, as indeed in most East Asian countries, the demo-
graphic transition has been given an extra and powerful push
by a workplace and family culture that makes it difficult for
women to balance jobs and babies.
THE COMING AGE WAVE IS INEVITABLE—
AND FOR BETTER OR WORSE, KOREA WILL
HAVE TO FACE THE CHALLENGES IT POSES.
Raising fertility, moreover, is a long-term strategy. Even 
if Korea’s fertility rate doubled next year, it would have no 
appreciable impact on the size of the workforce or the old-age
dependency burden for the next 25 to 30 years. Demography
is like an ocean liner and cannot be turned around quickly. 
The age wave is the consequence of demographic trends that
have already been set in motion. For better or worse, Korea
will have to face the challenges it poses.
MODERNIZATION AND RISING 
OLD-AGE DEPENDENCY
When Korea embarked on its development odyssey in 
the early 1960s, it was an impoverished nation with a real 
per capita GDP of roughly $1,500, just one-ninth of the U.S.
level, even at purchasing power parity values that take into
account differences in living standards. Then came the “mira-
cle on the Han” and four and a half decades of nearly uninter-
rupted economic growth. By 2005, Korea’s real per capita GDP
had risen to nearly $20,000, over half of the U.S. level and
two-thirds of the developed-country average. Korea now has
the world’s eleventh largest economy, measured in exchange
rate dollars. In 1996 it was admitted into the “high-income” 
membership of the Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development (OECD).
Korea is not the only country in Asia to have catapulted 
itself into the ranks of high-income countries over the past 
50 years. Japan and the three other “Tigers” (Hong Kong,
Singapore, and Taiwan) did so as well. With the exception of
Taiwan, however, the other countries all had a substantial head
start—and Korea’s GDP now exceeds that of the other three
Tigers combined.
Along the way, Korea has undergone a series of dramatic
changes—from overwhelmingly rural to predominantly urban,
from copycat manufacturer of cheap industrial products to
high-tech trailblazer, from cultural follower to undisputed
arbiter of cultural “cool” in East Asia. Just since 1980, the 
agricultural share of the workforce has shrunk from 34 to 
8 percent, while the service share has expanded from 44 
to 73 percent. The share of Koreans in their late twenties 
with college degrees has risen from under 10 percent to 
36 percent. Korea now has the highest rate of high school 
graduation in the OECD—and among the highest rates of 
college graduation. Korea’s “human development index” 
(a measure of social health and education compiled by the
United Nations) has risen from 0.75 to 0.91, by far the 
steepest climb since 1980 of any OECD nation.3
KOREA’S RAPID AGING IS INTERACTING 
WITH ITS RAPID DEVELOPMENT TO CREATE
NEW SOCIAL STRESSES.
In short, the breathtaking speed at which the Korean 
population is now aging is matched by the breathtaking 
speed at which the Korean economy and society have been
developing. These two facts indeed are connected, since the
aging associated with the demographic transition tends to
track, in all societies, the speed and timing of their moderniza-
tion. Rapid development, in turn, brings with it not just new
affluence and opportunity but also new vulnerability and
stress. Inevitably, when development is rapid, the affluence and
opportunity land mainly on the young while the vulnerability
and stress fall mainly on the old. The same historical process
which is expanding the relative number of elderly is also
threatening their material security and social identity.
11
3 Human Development Report (United Nations Development Program; various years).
The new vulnerability begins in midlife. In a labor market no
longer sheltered from the winds of globalization (especially
since the 1997 Asian financial crisis), older workers often find
themselves sidelined when their lifelong jobs are no longer in
demand. Traditional or “paternalistic” protection of older
employees is no longer affordable. As Korea’s industry moves
up the global value-added scale, the speed with which the
skills of the workforce become obsolete is accelerating—
rendering older workers unemployable even as they are
becoming more numerous.
THE POVERTY RATE OF THE ELDERLY IS 
THREE TIMES THAT OF THE YOUNG.
Once older workers retire, their vulnerability grows. They 
are unlikely to have saved much on their own, and only 
a minority have a public pension or employer retirement 
benefit. Means-tested welfare provides some assistance, but
the benefits are small and the coverage is narrow. In 2005, 
just 14 percent of the elderly received government social 
assistance, and the monthly benefit averaged less than $80
per person.4 Not surprisingly, the elderly poverty rate has 
been rising and is now three times that of the young.5
THE SHARE OF THE ELDERLY LIVING WITH
THEIR CHILDREN FELL FROM 81 PERCENT IN
1980 TO 44 PERCENT TODAY.
Most ominously, informal family support networks for the 
elderly are coming under increasing stress. Like most East
Asian societies, Korea’s traditional Confucian ethic of filial piety
requires the young to care for the old—and care for them they
do. Nearly half of Korean elders still live in extended families
with their children, and an even larger share rely on them as
their primary means of financial support. But the ethic of filial
piety is waning rapidly. In a 2006 survey of adults in their
fifties, only 28 percent answered yes when asked if they
thought their children would support them.6 As recently as
1980, 81 percent of elders lived with their extended families.
Today, the figure is 44 percent and (apparently) still declining
under the influence of modernization—including the decline in
family size, the rise in individualistic or “western” values, and
the emergence of a yawning generation gap. (See Figure 6.)
In none of today’s fully developed countries are the differences
in income, educational attainment, formative life experiences,
and (even) political party affiliation between young adults and
elders so vast as they are in today’s Korea.
Absent new government policies, the vulnerability of Korea’s
elders is almost certain to grow more acute. As both the 
number of children per family and the marriage rate decline, 
it will become ever-less likely that an adult child or in-law will
12
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be available to care for an elder. Higher geographic mobility
will also tend to disrupt the lifelong care networks that elders 
traditionally rely on for assistance. In developed societies,
moreover, a rising share of what elders need—especially 
medical and skilled nursing care—cannot always be reliably
provided by sympathetic friends and kin. Inevitably, tomorrow’s
elders will be more in need of financial resources than today’s.
Given how successful Koreans have been at developing 
their economy over the last half century, many may suppose
that continued economic growth and rising affluence will by
themselves overcome the problems posed by the aging of 
the population. The experience of other high-income 
countries shows otherwise. Without sound public policy 
direction, modernization increases the vulnerability of the old.
More critically, when modernization is not integrated into
enduring social traditions, it can give rise to a clash in social
expectations that can worsen the severity of the aging 
challenge and threaten the mainspring of national develop-
ment itself. An important example is the slow adaptation of
customary workplace and family culture to the changing role
of women. The difficulty that Korean women face in balancing
jobs and babies is a major reason why the fertility rate has 
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fallen so low and why the extended family continues to
weaken. Unless it is resolved, it may gradually push Korea into 
a vicious cycle of faster aging, swifter population decline, and
intolerable elder dependency. Changing course will depend 
on national leadership. But it will also require all Koreans 
(men and women alike) to change deep-seated social attitudes
and help reshape family and workplace institutions.
THE ECONOMIC CHALLENGES AHEAD
The initial phase of Korea’s demographic transformation 
has brought undeniable economic benefits. When fertility 
rates fall, societies typically enjoy a temporary “demographic
dividend,” a span of time in which the relative number of 
children declines much more rapidly than the relative number
of elders rises. The result is a dramatic increase in the share of
the population in the traditional working years. Since fertility
rates first began falling in Korea, the population aged 20 to 
64 has grown steadily as a share of the total population—
from 45 percent in 1960 to 65 percent in 2005. (See Figure 7.)
At the same time, declining child dependency has freed up
women’s time for participation in the market economy. 
Over the past 45 years, the overall rate of female labor-force
participation in Korea has increased from 37 to 50 percent.
Both of these trends have helped fuel development and 
boost per capita incomes.
Beginning 10 to 15 years from now, however, the period of
demographic dividend will end as the relative growth in the
elderly population begins to overwhelm the relative decline in
the child population. While the demographic transformation
has so far been leaning with economic growth, it will soon
begin leaning against it.
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BY 2050, THERE MAY BE ONLY ONE KOREAN
WORKER TO SUPPORT EACH RETIRED ELDER.
Today in Korea, there are 7.2 working-age adults available to
support each elder. That “support ratio” is due to fall to 2.5 by
2030 and to 1.3 by 2050.  (See Figure 8.) Assuming that not
every man and woman is continuously employed between age
20 and 64, this projection implies that there may be only one
(or even less than one) taxpaying worker for each retired 
beneficiary. Much of the rising burden of caring for the elderly
will continue to fall on families. But as Korea’s welfare state
matures, a large share will inevitably show up in public
budgets—and in taxpayer contributions.
Graying means paying—more for pensions, more for health
care, more for nursing homes and other social services for 
the elderly. The Korean government today spends just 2.6
percent of GDP on old-age benefits. Assuming that current
benefit programs remain unchanged, this share is on track to
rise to 18.9 percent of GDP by 2050, a seven-fold increase.
(See Figure 9.)
Much of the extra burden is attributable to the growing cost
of public pension programs. The cost of the National Pension
System, which covers private-sector workers and has yet to
mature, is projected to rise from 0.4 percent of GDP in 2005
to 7.3 percent by 2050. Including Korea’s special pension pro-
grams for government employees, private school teachers, and
the armed forces, the total cost of public pensions will reach
10.2 percent of GDP. Pensions, of course, are not the only
spending programs whose cost will be rising as society ages.
The elderly are also disproportionate consumers of 
medical and long-term care services. If current rates of per
capita utilization remain unchanged and historical cost trends
15
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continue, spending on health care and long-term care for the
elderly will reach 7.8 percent of GDP by 2050. Means-tested
welfare programs account for the remainder of the projected 
spending burden.
UNDER A REALISTIC SCENARIO, 
THE COST OF GOVERNMENT OLD-AGE 
BENEFITS COULD EASILY EXCEED 
25 PERCENT OF GDP BY 2050.
As dramatic as these projections are, they may vastly
understate the future burden that the aging of Korea will
place on public budgets. The projections for the NPS assume
that a large share of the workforce will remain outside of the 
system and earn no benefit at all. They also assume that 
benefits for those in the system will replace a much smaller
share of preretirement income than the system’s nominal
replacement rates suggest. If the public insists that the NPS
protect vulnerable elders and correct for these shortfalls, its
cost (as we shall see) would climb by another 6.6 percent 
of GDP by 2050. The cost of all benefits for the elderly would
then rise to 25.5 percent of GDP. Even this number assumes
that utilization rates for long-term care services will not rise in
the future—although they will likely increase rapidly after
2008, when the government plans to phase in a new 
universal long-term care entitlement.
Korea today is a relatively low-tax economy with diminutive
social insurance and welfare programs and a smaller public
sector than any OECD country other than Mexico and Turkey.
The aging of Korea’s population is about to change all of 
that. Without fundamental reform of its retirement system, the
rising old-age dependency burden will translate into a 
rising tax burden. Either that, or the government will run
mounting fiscal deficits that will undermine national savings
and cripple the economy. In the latter scenario, according to
Standard & Poor’s, the credit rating of the Korean government
would sink to junk bond status (“speculative grade,” to be
exact) as early as 2025.7
Even apart from the fiscal impact, Korea’s demographic trans-
formation threatens to usher in an era of slower economic 
and living standard growth. Assuming current rates of labor-
force participation remain unchanged, Korea’s workforce will
be shrinking by 1.2 percent per year by the 2030s and 
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KOREA’S 
DEMOGRAPHIC 
TRANSFORMATION
THREATENS TO
USHER IN AN ERA
OF SLOWER 
ECONOMIC AND
LIVING STANDARD
GROWTH.
1.4 percent per year by the 2040s. Unless productivity rises at
least as fast as employment declines, the growth in Korea’s
real GDP will stagnate—not just during recessions, but chroni-
cally over the entire business cycle. While a 1.4 percent pro-
ductivity growth rate may not seem like much by Korea’s his-
torical standards, it is about the average for mature developed
economies over the past 25 years.
While faster productivity growth is possible, here too demo-
graphics will be leaning the other way. A demographically con-
tracting Korea, having less need for capital broadening, will
tend to accumulate an aging stock of physical capital. And
with each birth cohort smaller than the last, it will also acquire
an aging stock of human capital—quite possibly deficient in
the risk-taking and entrepreneurial drive associated with youth.
Although the possibility of capital shortages seems like a
remote danger today, this too could become a challenge as
the share of Korea’s population in the high-saving middle years
declines and the share in the low-saving elder years rises.
Several economists have concluded that the “life-cycle 
savings” incentive (saving in midlife to prepare for old age) is
an especially powerful savings motivator in East Asian
societies.8 If so, a fast-aging Korea may need to take precau-
tions against a falling savings rate—a development which is
now prompting worries in Japan.
The impact of stagnating growth on Korea’s national mood
may be profound. The young and growing Korea of the past
45 years has been an optimistic and future-oriented Korea,
focused on posterity and confident in its destiny. The mood in
a demographically aging and contracting Korea could be very
different. Societies often react defensively when facing a zero-
sum and zero-growth economy. In the business realm, they
may favor cartels, managed trade, and beggar-thy-neighbor
protectionism. In the political realm, they may favor consump-
tion over investment, the present over the future, and the old
over the young. These challenges are not unique to Korea, but
given the magnitude of its age wave—and the speed with
which it is approaching—they are especially daunting.
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Korea launched its National Pension System in 1988 amid
great optimism. It was the year of the Seoul Olympics and 
a new democratic government, and the pension system was
seen as a marker of increased development and expected
entry into the OECD. In the years since, the optimism has
faded as aging has begun to wreak its toll on the system’s 
cost projections. There may still be some Koreans who think
that the NPS is a “low contribution, high benefit” miracle, 
but most are coming to suspect that this is an illusion. The
government has already raised contributions and cut benefits
once, and has proposed doing so again. Adding to concerns 
is the fact that growing numbers of workers are gaming the
system and not paying their fair share of contributions.
The cost outlook is certainly dire. According to the official 
government projections, NPS outlays are due to rise from 
1.7 percent of workers’ taxable earnings in 2005 to 30 percent
by 2050. The situation, however, is even more serious than the
cost projections suggest. Despite the rising fiscal burden, the
benefits that the NPS offers are not very generous. In fact, they
are actually quite modest, both because the system leaves one-
third of the workforce uncovered and because its replacement
rates, properly measured, are nearly one-third lower than the
government claims. This means that cutting NPS benefits to
control long-term costs may not be a viable option. Indeed,
Korea will be under increasing pressure to raise, not lower,
benefits as it continues to develop and traditional support net-
works for the elderly unravel.
AN AGING KOREA NEEDS A PUBLIC 
RETIREMENT SYSTEM THAT IS BROAD, 
GENEROUS, AND WELL DESIGNED.
There are two distinct, if related, developments now conspiring
to push up old-age benefit spending in Korea. The first is the
extraordinarily rapid pace of aging, which in and of itself will
require a very large increase in spending. The second is the
extraordinarily rapid pace of development, which means that
Korea needs a public pension system that is broad and gener-
ous and well designed. An underdeveloped economy with a
young population and intact family support networks can get
by with a small pension system that tolerates gaps in coverage
and widespread gaming. A developed economy with an aging
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population and weakening families cannot. This is especially
true in Korea, since the personal saving rate is low and the 
private pension system is in its infancy.
In short, there is no such thing as a low cost public pension
system for a rapidly aging developed economy. But fortunately,
Korea is in a better position to minimize the cost than any 
of today’s developed economies. Because the NPS is still 
immature, it is not yet burdened economically by large
unfunded benefit liabilities or hemmed in politically by power-
ful entitled constituencies. If Korea faces up to the challenge, 
it still has time to change course and transition from today’s
unsustainable system to a less costly and more adequate 
system based in large part on fully funded retirement savings.
KOREA’S PUBLIC SYSTEM: 
“HIGH CONTRIBUTION, LOW BENEFIT”
Although Korea has had special public pension schemes 
for government employees and the armed forces since the
1960s and for private school teachers since the 1970s, it only
established a public system for private-sector workers in 1988.
Coverage under the National Pension System was originally
limited to workers at firms with 10 or more employees, or
about 25 percent of the labor force. Beginning in the early
1990s, however, the system was expanded in stages to include
employees at smaller firms, farmers, and the self-employed.
Although the NPS in principle now offers universal coverage, 
it is still immature. The number of beneficiaries is small and
payroll contributions exceed benefits by a wide margin, 
generating large payroll tax surpluses. As of 2005, just 23 
percent of adults over age 60, the NPS retirement age, 
were collecting a pension.
When the government first set up the NPS, it promised 
participants a 70 percent replacement rate at an ultimate 
contribution rate of 6 percent. The system was hardly up 
and running, however, when it became clear that collapsing
fertility and soaring life expectancy made this original deal
unaffordable. In 1998, the government raised the contribution
rate to 9 percent and lowered the replacement rate to 60 
percent, while also scheduling a phased increase in the retire-
ment age from 60 to 65 between 2013 and 2033. With the
demographic outlook continuing to deteriorate, the National
Assembly is now considering raising the contribution rate 
and cutting the replacement rate once again.
THE COST OF THE NPS 
WILL RISE FROM 1.7 PERCENT OF 
WORKERS’ EARNINGS TODAY 
TO 30 PERCENT BY 2050.
As these worries about long-term costs reveal, population
aging is beginning to undermine the sustainability of the 
NPS. In 2005, total benefits paid out under the NPS amounted
to 1.7 percent of workers’ taxable earnings, or just one-fifth 
of the system’s current 9 percent contribution rate. By 2025,
however, the system’s cost rate is projected to exceed its 
contribution rate—and the cost rate is due to keep rising
thereafter, to 21.5 percent by 2040, 30.0 percent by 2050,
and 39.1 percent by 2070, the government’s projection 
horizon. (See Figure 10.)
Public defined benefit pension plans like the NPS seem 
affordable when contributors greatly outnumber beneficiaries.
But, unless they are fully funded, the contribution rate needed
to pay promised benefits rises by leaps and bounds as popula-
tions age and the systems mature. It is true that the NPS is
now accumulating a large reserve fund that is supposed to
help defray future costs, but even if the reserve fund build-up
occurs exactly as planned it will not constitute anything close
to full funding of the system’s benefit promises. Consequently,
the NPS will suffer the fate of pay-as-you-go pension plans
around the world. Its surpluses will eventually narrow and,
unless contributions are raised or benefits cut, turn into 
widening deficits. In the end, despite offering a deteriorating
rate of return, it will go bankrupt. According to the official
government projections, this is due to happen in 2047.
Even the system’s partial prefunding, moreover, may rest on 
little more than an accounting illusion. Many other countries,
including Japan and the United States, have tried to use 
government reserve funds to partially prefund public pension
systems. The track record is not encouraging. With few excep-
tions, the funds have ended up serving as back-door financing
mechanisms for the general government budget. The reserve
fund surpluses have not been translated into overall budget
surpluses—and so have not raised national savings, the 
essential precondition for genuine prefunding.
Although the Korean government is taking steps to shore 
up the reserve fund’s finances, it is unclear how effective they
will be. Prior to a major reform in 2000, the reserve fund was
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managed by the Ministry of Finance and Economy, which 
used most of it to finance “social overhead capital” and pay 
for other government programs. Since the reform, which 
transferred management of the fund to the Ministry of Health
and Welfare, the assets have been shifted into financial-sector
securities, including a small share in domestic and foreign 
equities. There is still no effective legal or procedural firewall,
however, that prevents the government from spending or 
borrowing against the reserve fund savings. And in fact, in the
nearly twenty years that the NPS has been in operation, there
has been only one year in which the government has run a
budget surplus excluding the reserve fund surplus.9
THE PROBLEM WITH GOVERNMENT 
PREFUNDING IS THAT IT REQUIRES A 
LEVEL OF FISCAL DISCIPLINE FEW 
GOVERNMENTS CAN SUSTAIN.
The fundamental problem with government prefunding is 
that it requires a level of fiscal discipline that few governments
are able to sustain. For the strategy to work, Korea’s leaders
would have to let the reserve fund accumulate untouched
decade in and decade out, no matter what the economic or
political emergency. Inevitably, there will be occasions—
perhaps a major recession, perhaps reunification—when the
temptation to tap into the fund will become overwhelming.
If the government’s partial prefunding strategy fails, Korean
workers will find themselves facing huge contribution hikes
beginning in the 2020s—either that, or retirees will find 
themselves facing huge benefit cuts. Yet even if the strategy
succeeds, the NPS will still not be sustainable. Once the reserve
fund is exhausted in 2047, the contribution rate would have 
to be raised all at once to 30 percent to cover the system’s 
full annual pay-as-you-go cost—thus inflicting an enormous
21
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injustice on future generations of workers. The government’s
current reform proposal, which calls for raising the system’s
contribution rate to 12.9 percent and cutting its replacement
rate to 50 percent, would merely postpone the day of 
reckoning to 2065. In the end, the NPS would still run 
over the same financial cliff.
The Korean press often describes the NPS as a “low 
contribution, high benefit” system. Pension reformers have
come to understand that the first part of this proposition is 
not really true. Although the contribution rate is relatively low
today, it will have to rise steeply as the age wave rolls in. What
the reformers have yet to understand is that the second part
of the proposition is not true either. The breadth and level of
retirement income protection that the NPS offers is in fact
quite modest, indeed inadequate—and will come increasingly 
to be regarded as such as Korea becomes a fully 
developed economy.
ACTUAL NPS BENEFIT LEVELS ARE MUCH 
LESS GENEROUS THAN THE SYSTEM’S 
NOMINAL REPLACEMENT RATES SUGGEST.
The NPS promises average earners a benefit replacing 
60 percent of wages after 40 years of contributions. Most
Koreans assume this means that their pension will replace 
60 percent of their final earnings, but this is not the case. The
system’s nominal 60 percent replacement rate refers to a
worker’s career average earnings, which are typically much
lower. Replacement rates are almost always calculated relative
to final earnings, since it is the share of final earnings a pen-
sion replaces that determines living standards in retirement. 
On a final salary basis, the NPS now offers average earners
with a full 40-year career a replacement rate estimated to be
just 42 percent. Under the government’s reform proposal, 
that final salary replacement rate would fall all the way to 
35 percent. (See Figure 11.)
Most of tomorrow’s workers, moreover, will have careers that
are shorter than 40 years. As Koreans become more educated,
they are entering the labor force at later ages. Many, especially
women, will experience lengthy interruptions in their careers
when they are not employed and so are not earning benefits.
The vast majority of workers at medium and large firms are
also subject to mandatory retirement in their mid-fifties, and
thus exit the labor force early as well. The government’s long-
term projections assume that the typical retiree will have con-
tributed to the NPS for just under 30 years—which, given the
way contribution years are credited in the system’s benefit for-
mula, means that the final salary replacement rate for the typi-
cal average earner may only be about 30 percent under current
law and 25 percent under the government’s reform proposal.
There is another little understood feature of the NPS which
could drive replacement rates even lower. The official 
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projections cited in this report assume that the ceiling on 
taxable wages will, in the future, be indexed to the growth 
in average wages. The ceiling, however, is not currently
indexed—and in fact has been fixed in nominal won since
1988. Unless the law is changed, the replacement rates of
many—and eventually most workers—will fall over time as
incomes rise and a growing share of total earnings exceeds 
the cap and so is excluded from the benefit formula.
JUST 65 PERCENT OF KOREA’S LABOR FORCE IS
CURRENTLY EARNING A BENEFIT UNDER THE
NPS OR ANOTHER PUBLIC PENSION PROGRAM.
As for breadth of benefits, the NPS is universal in name alone.
As of 2004, 13 percent of the covered labor force failed to
participate at all. Evasion is an especially serious problem
among the self-employed, who, unlike employees, must pay
the full 9 percent contribution rate themselves. With nearly
two-thirds of Korea’s total labor force either self-employed 
or working as day laborers, unpaid family workers, or short-
term “irregular” employees, enforcing compliance is next to
impossible. Even among those workers who do participate in
the NPS, nearly one in three make no contributions in a given
year, usually because their reported earnings fail to exceed 
the system’s taxable earnings floor. Overall in 2004, just 
65 percent of Korea’s labor force was actually earning a 
benefit under the NPS or one of the special public pension
plans for government employees, private school teachers, 
and the armed forces. (See Figure 12.) While rates of pension
receipt among the elderly will rise as the NPS matures, the
large gaps in coverage mean that even a half century from
now a large share of the elderly—perhaps as many as one-
third—will still not be receiving a benefit.
A related problem is the failure of the NPS to target elders 
in poverty. To be sure, the system has a progressive benefit 
formula that pays higher replacement rates to lower earners—
and allows them to qualify for full benefits with fewer years of
contributions. But public policy experts universally agree that
progressive benefit formulas are a very inefficient way to help
the poor elderly, since retirees’ wage histories only bear a loose
relationship to their actual need in old age. To the extent that
a contributory pension system tries to redistribute income
through its benefit formula, moreover, it invites participants 
to underreport their earnings in order to get a more generous
return on their contributions. This is an especially serious 
problem in Korea, given the government’s weak enforcement
capability. It may also be a partial explanation for the low levels
of active participation in the NPS. Some people may be cycling
in and out of contributor status in order to earn the full subsi-
dized benefit with the minimum required contribution years.
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Korea’s leaders seem to believe that it is possible to take the
NPS, with its relatively modest benefit levels and large gaps in
coverage, and cut it back further. The reality is that, as Korea
continues to develop, it will need a more, not a less generous
public pension system. The ethic of filial piety is declining.
Families are getting weaker, and, as the marketized and 
monetized economy grows, even strong families are able to
provide for fewer needs of the elderly. Signs of an emerging
crisis are already visible in rising rates of elderly poverty and a
widening income gap between young and old. Korea’s leaders
are becoming concerned about these trends, which is why,
even as they discuss rolling back “overly generous” NPS 
benefits, they are beginning to expand means-tested 
poverty protection for the poor elderly.
AS CURRENTLY STRUCTURED, KOREA’S
NATIONAL PENSION SYSTEM IS BOTH 
UNAFFORDABLE AND INADEQUATE.
Although a rapidly developing Korea needs a more generous
retirement system, it is also true that a rapidly aging Korea
cannot afford to finance it on a pay-as-you-go basis. If cover-
age under the NPS were actually universal, and if the system
really paid the government’s announced replacement rates, its
long-term cost would be nearly twice current projections—not
7.3 percent of GDP in 2050, but 13.9 percent.10 And this pro-
jection assumes a future fertility rate (1.4) that is substantially
above today’s level and a blistering future rate of real wage
growth (an average of 3.6 percent until 2040) that will be
increasingly difficult to achieve as Korea’s population ages. 
The huge gap between the official projections and the cost 
of honoring today’s implicit promises is at once a measure 
of how unaffordable and inadequate the current system is.
KOREA’S PRIVATE SYSTEM:
FROM SEVERENCE PAY TO PENSIONS
A broad and generous public pension system would be less cru-
cial if most Koreans were saving adequately for their retirement
privately, either on their own or through employment-based
pension plans. Unfortunately, this is not the case. Most house-
holds have little long-term savings, and though the government
is trying to encourage the development of a corporate pension
system, its size is still small and its outlook uncertain.
MOST KOREANS SAVE LITTLE 
FOR RETIREMENT ON THEIR OWN.
The lion’s share of household wealth in Korea—83 percent 
in 2001—is invested in housing. While the family home may
have been sufficient old-age security in the days of dutiful 
children and an exchange economy, tomorrow’s elderly
increasingly will have to rely on financial assets. Yet financial
wealth accounts for just 17 percent of total household wealth,
and of this three-quarters is in low-return bank deposits.11
(See Figure 13.) Although households may intend some share
of the bank deposits for retirement, they are rarely locked in
for the long term. Since 1994, individuals have had the option
of contributing to a tax-favored personal pension system, 
but only 11 percent of working-age adults do so. Overall, total
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10 CSIS’ “no benefit gap” projection assumes first, that the active contribution rate among NPS covered workers will rise from roughly 60 to 90 percent and that two-thirds of the
increase will be translated into new benefit awards; and second, that the system’s actual replacement rates (initial benefits as a percent of final salary) will match its nominal
replacement rates.
11 Kyeongwon Yoo, “Empirical Analysis of Precautionary Portfolio Allocation: Evidence for Korea,” Bank of Korea Economic Papers vol. 8, no. 1 (September 2005).
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personal pension assets amounted to just 2.7 percent of GDP
in 2005.12 The one place where most households are doing
any real retirement savings is in life insurance, where total
invested assets came to 19 percent of GDP in 2005.13
To be sure, Korea is famous for its high national savings rate,
which registered an impressive 33 percent of GDP in 2005. 
But most of this consists of government savings and retained
corporate earnings. The overall household-sector savings rate
is much lower—just 6.5 percent of GDP—and the personal
savings rate is lower still. In 2005, Korean families on average
saved just 4.3 percent of their disposable incomes. And this
average conceals vast differences between upper-income
households (whose saving rate is positive and rising) and 
lower-income households (whose savings rate is negative 
and falling). The Bank of Korea recently warned that these
trends threaten to place a growing share of Koreans at risk 
of poverty in old age.14
Many developed countries have large funded employer 
pension systems that help take pressure off public retirement
systems and family support networks. Korea does not. The
principal employer-sponsored retirement benefit for private-
sector workers consists of a lump-sum severance pay
allowance payable when a worker leaves the firm. While the
system offers significant benefits to long-term career employ-
ees, it is entirely inadequate to meet the needs of most of
tomorrow’s elderly.
THE EMPLOYER SEVERANCE PAY 
SYSTEM COVERS LESS THAN ONE-THIRD 
OF KOREA’S TOTAL LABOR FORCE.
To begin with, the severance pay system covers only a fraction
of the workforce. Korea’s labor laws require that firms with
five or more employees pay workers with long-term employ-
ment contracts a severance pay allowance equal to at least
one month of salary for each year of job tenure. Such workers,
however, represent a relatively privileged labor-force elite. As 
of 2002, the severance pay system covered just 46 percent of
all wage and salary workers—and just 29 percent of Korea’s
total labor force.15
Narrow coverage is not the system’s only problem. While it
may once have functioned as a retirement scheme back in 
the days of lifetime employment, it no longer does so for 
most workers. With average employee job tenure just 5.6
years, many workers get multiple lump-sum payouts during
their careers. According to a Korea Labor Institute survey, 
53 percent of recipients use the payouts to cover basic living
expenses, while just 21 percent save them.16 Many employers
do not even wait for workers to leave the firm before cashing
out their severance pay. A large number pay out the benefits
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12 Korea Fund Ratings, “Current Situation of Individual Pension Management,” (in Korean) Fund Research (February 17, 2006).
13 Financial Market Trends, vol. 2006/2, no. 91 (OECD; November 2006).
14 Jayoung Yoon, “Saving Gap Widens Classes,” The Korea Times (October 26, 2006).
15 Jaijoon Hur, “Korean Severance Pay Reform: For Old-Age Income Security or Coverage Expansion?” paper presented at the International  Workshop on Severance Pay Reform: Toward
Unemployment Savings and Retirement Accounts (Laxenberg/Vienna; November, 7-8, 2003).
16 Jaijoon Hur, op. cit.
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each month as they accrue along with workers’ regular 
paychecks, an arrangement allowed under the special
“Yeonbong” wage contract system.
MOST SEVERANCE PAY ASSETS ARE 
IN CORPORATE BOOK RESERVES.
Benefits earned under the severance pay system are also 
insecure. Many employers do not fund the benefits at all—
and even when they do, much of the funding occurs through
internal corporate “book reserves.” As of 2004, 77 percent of
all funded severance pay assets were in book reserves, while
23 percent were externally funded through special investment
arrangements known as Retirement Insurance (RI) and
Retirement Trusts (RT). (See Figure 14.) Book reserve financing
leaves workers’ severance pay benefits entirely dependent on
the continued solvency of the firm. Yet even the RI and RT
arrangements offer little of the protection of genuine pension
funds, since employers have broad discretion over how 
much they contribute annually and can often borrow 
against the funds.
Not surprisingly, workers frequently end up losing their 
benefits when a firm goes bankrupt. According to a Korea
Labor Institute survey of workers who were laid off in 1998,
nearly one-quarter of those entitled to severance pay did not
receive it.17 The government has tried to address the problem
by establishing a “Pay Guarantee Fund” financed through
employer premiums. The fund, however, only covers benefits
up to three years of job tenure, and so does not offer 
meaningful retirement income protection.
The Korean government is now trying to convert the existing
unfunded severance pay system into a new system of funded
corporate pensions. As of December 2005, firms have the
option, with union consent, of replacing their old severance
pay scheme with a defined benefit or defined contribution
pension plan. Coverage under the new pension plans is limited
to workers with long-term employment contracts, just as it is
for the old severance pay schemes. Beginning in 2008, 
however, firms with fewer than five employees will for
the first time be required to participate in the system.
ALTHOUGH THE GOVERNMENT IS 
TRYING TO ENCOURAGE THE DEVELOPMENT
OF GENUINE PRIVATE PENSIONS, THE 
REFORM IS OFF TO A SLOW START.
Korea’s new corporate pension system could play a crucial 
role in improving the future retirement security of at least a
part of the workforce. If it is to do so, however, firms will 
first have to join it—and thus far participation has come in 
far beneath initial government expectations. As of November
2006, just 3.1 percent of eligible firms and 2.7 percent of 
eligible employees were enrolled in the new pension plans.
(See Figure 15.)
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Industry experts are beginning to worry that the reform will
not take off unless employers are given greater incentives to
set up pension plans. Although the tax treatment accorded the
new pension funds is more favorable than that accorded the
book reserves, the overall limit on deductibility for each partici-
pant is relatively low. For many employers, the non-tax advan-
tages of book reserves, which allow them to use severance pay
assets as operating capital, may outweigh the tax advantages
of the pension plans. As for employees, many have a strong
cultural preference for lump-sum payouts, and so may prefer
traditional severance pay schemes despite their greater risk.
Some experts expect that participation rates will rise after
2010, when the existing RI and RT external funding 
arrangements are due to lose their tax-favored status, and
employers will be required to roll over the funds into a pension
plan or pay them out as lump sums to workers. Just a fraction
of total severance pay funds, however, are now in RIs or RTs—
and while large firms who want to be perceived as responsible
employers may choose the roll over option, many smaller 
firms may simply cash out.
A CLOUD OF INSECURITY HANGS OVER THE
RETIREMENT PROSPECTS OF MOST KOREANS.
A cloud of insecurity now hangs over the retirement 
prospects of most Koreans. Many are still in a state of denial.
In a survey of 1,000 Seoul office workers conducted by the
Korea Chamber of Commerce and Industry, 45 percent
admitted to having no retirement savings at all, but just 1.3
percent said they were counting on “their children or society”
for support in old age.18 Others seem to have accepted the
new insecurity as an inescapable fact of life. In this environ-
ment, a best-selling book called “My Dream, Making One
Billion Won” can pass as a retirement planning primer. Striking
it rich is a necessity, explains author Daejung Kim, since the
National Pension System is in financial trouble and “the value
of filial piety is almost gone and you can’t rely on your children
after retirement.”19 The problem, needless to say, is that not 
everyone can win the lottery.
A NEW DIRECTION FOR REFORM
The central challenge of retirement reform in an aging 
society is how to ensure a decent standard of living for the 
old without placing an unsustainable burden on the young.
Meeting this challenge will require a fundamental restructuring
of Korea’s retirement system. CSIS recommends a three-step
reform strategy: creating a universal floor of protection, 
transforming the NPS by combining it with a mandatory 
system of fully funded “add-on” personal accounts, and
expanding supplementary employer pensions.
KOREA MUST FUNDAMENTALLY 
RESTRUCTURE ITS RETIREMENT SYSTEM.
The debate over retirement reform in Korea often begins and
ends with proposals to extend the “solvency” of the NPS
reserve fund. This is the wrong goal. While the system’s long-
term deficit needs to be closed, reforms that merely raise NPS
contributions and cut NPS benefits will not correct its underly-
ing problems. Despite the rising burden on workers, they will
not ensure the system’s long-term fiscal and economic sustain-
ability. And they will not improve—and indeed would wors-
en—the retirement income prospects of future retirees.
ONLY ONE OUT OF TEN 
WORKING-AGE PARTICIPANTS IS 
“SATISFIED” WITH THE NPS.
The Korean public is understandably growing impatient 
with “pay more, get less” solutions that fail to address the
underlying problems. Numerous recent opinion surveys have
shown that large majorities of the public distrust the current
NPS system, doubt they will receive a pension, and would 
prefer that participation be voluntary. Among the young, 
the level of discontent is especially high. According to a 2005
survey commissioned by the National Pension Service, just 11
percent of participants in their forties, 10 percent of those in
their thirties, and 9 percent of those in their twenties are 
“satisfied” with the system.20 Yet at the same time, the over-
whelming majority of Koreans say that they are counting on
government to find a solution to the aging challenge.
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18 Yonse Kim, “1 in 2 Workers Unprepared for Retirement,” The Korea Times (August 8, 2006).
19 Quoted in Taegyun Kim, “Many Workers Chasing 1 Billion Won Pot of Gold,” The Korea Herald (January 30, 2004).
20 “National Pension: Satisfaction and Reliability are Going Down,” (in Korean) Yonhap News Agency (October 27, 2006).
How can an aging Korea care for its growing number of elders
without overburdening the young? How can it honor the
promise of adequate retirement income support that the
National Pension System is making but failing to deliver?
THE FOUNDATION OF KOREA’S RETIREMENT
SYSTEM MUST BE A UNIVERSAL FLOOR OF
PROTECTION AGAINST POVERTY IN OLD AGE.
The foundation of the retirement system must be a floor of
protection against destitution in old age. The NPS is supposed
to provide this, but it is not succeeding. The combination of
weak enforcement and high levels of self-employment and
irregular employment makes it nearly impossible for today’s
contributory system to ensure universal coverage. What’s 
needed is a general revenue financed basic pension system
that would guarantee a minimum level of old-age support 
to all Koreans, regardless of their employment history. Korea’s
1997 National Pension Reform Board, the OECD, and the
World Bank have all recommended the introduction of 
just such a system.
The floor of protection could consist of either a means-tested
benefit or a universal flat benefit—that is, a fixed won amount
for everyone. The advantage of means-testing is that the cost
of the system would be more manageable. The disadvantage
is that it might create incentives to undersave during the work-
ing years and to underreport income during the retirement
years. Assessing financial need is also inherently complex 
and can become the object of political manipulation. A 
means-tested system would therefore have to be carefully
designed, with benefits phased out gradually as incomes rise.
A flat benefit would avoid these incentive problems. Delivering
the same level of poverty protection, however, would be much
more expensive. According to the OECD, a universal flat bene-
fit equal to 20 percent of average earnings would cost roughly 
2 percent of GDP today and more than triple that by 2050.21
Either strategy could be made to work, but each has its 
own pros and cons.
Beyond the floor of protection, Korea needs to fashion 
a retirement system which, over time, can allow most of 
the elderly to enjoy something close to their preretirement
standard of living. Many Koreans are counting on the private
severance pay system to fulfill this income replacement func-
tion, but the system’s coverage is relatively narrow and the
benefits are insecure. The NPS is also supposed to fulfill this
function, but it too is failing. Not only will a significant share 
of tomorrow’s elderly have no pension, but the benefit levels
of those who do will be relatively low. The wide gap between
what the NPS seems to promise and what it will actually deliv-
er poses a serious fiscal and social challenge, since the cost of
supporting elders with inadequate retirement incomes will 
ultimately be shifted to government welfare budgets or fragile
family support networks. It could also become a political 
problem if Koreans conclude that the government has
betrayed its promises.
FINANCING MORE GENEROUS BENEFITS ON A
PAY-AS-YOU-GO BASIS IS NOT AN OPTION.
Financing more generous retirement benefits on a pay-as-you-
go basis is not an option. The only viable solution is to rely
more heavily, in both the private and public sectors, on fully
funded systems that allow elders to finance a much larger
share of their own retirement incomes through savings set
aside during the working years.
On the private side, Korea could begin to move in this 
direction by strengthening incentives for employers to convert
existing unfunded severance pay schemes into genuinely 
funded pensions. The place to start is to increase tax
deductibility limits for the new corporate pension option, 
while entirely phasing out tax breaks for internal book
reserves. The government should also consider making the
corporate pension system “opt out” rather than “opt in”—
in other words, making corporate pensions the default option,
while only allowing firms to opt out with union consent. This is
the approach now being followed in Italy, which like Korea is
also trying to convert a largely unfunded severance pay system
into corporate pensions. At the same time, to improve the
security of the system and increase its attractiveness to
employees, government will need to establish a pension 
insurance agency, similar to the Pension Benefit Guaranty
Corporation in the United States, that guarantees benefits in
the event firms with underfunded plans go bankrupt. If even
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these stronger incentives fail to jump start the system, the 
government could simply mandate that firms convert their 
severance pay schemes into pensions. While this may meet
considerable resistance from employers, it is the standard prac-
tice in nearly all developed countries with large private pension
systems, including Australia, Canada, the Netherlands, the
United Kingdom, and the United States.
THE GOVERNMENT SHOULD MAKE 
EXPANDING THE NEW CORPORATE PENSION
SYSTEM A TOP PRIORITY.
Korea’s new corporate pension system has the potential to
greatly improve the retirement security of millions of Korean
workers. The government should make expanding it a top 
priority. In the end, however, even a well-developed private
pension system is not a substitute for an adequate and afford-
able public system. Even if the government were to make 
corporate pensions mandatory for all regular employees, a
large share of the labor force would still be without funded
retirement savings. The generosity of the benefits, moreover,
would vary greatly from firm to firm—and, to the extent that
companies offer defined benefit pensions, workers’ retirement
savings might not be fully portable.  
The NPS should therefore remain the mainstay of retirement
support. To achieve its mission, however, it will have to be
restructured. Some have proposed allowing employers to
“contract out” of the system so long as they offer their
employees funded private pensions whose benefits are at 
least as generous as NPS benefits, a practice that is common 
in Japan and the United Kingdom. But allowing contracting
out would create multiple classes of beneficiaries and under-
mine the efficiency, equity, and economies of scale that only 
a single national system can provide.  
CSIS believes that a better approach is to transform the NPS 
by combining it with a system of fully funded personal retire-
ment accounts. Let us be clear: This is not a recommendation
to privatize the system. The accounts would be personally
owned and privately managed. However, the accounts would
also be mandatory and strictly regulated as an integral part of
Korea’s social insurance system.
AT THE SAME TIME, IT SHOULD 
CONSIDER COMBINING THE NPS WITH 
A MANDATORY SYSTEM OF FULLY 
FUNDED PERSONAL ACCOUNTS.
Under the CSIS proposal, the government would create a
National Personal Accounts (NPA) plan and formally incorpo-
rate it into the NPS as a new component of the system. Under
the NPA plan, a personally owned account would be set up 
on behalf of every worker enrolled in the NPS. The NPA plan
would have the following features:
• The NPA plan would not change current or future NPS 
benefits for disabled workers or young survivors. Unlike 
benefits to retirees and aged survivors, these categories of
benefits function purely as insurance and can be provided
more efficiently by taking advantage of the risk pooling 
that the current system allows.
• The NPA plan would be mandatory, because its benefits
would constitute an important part of what Korea deems 
to be an “adequate” retirement income—and because 
experience shows that the people who opt out of a volun-
tary system tend to be the people most in need later on.
• The NPA plan would be fully funded, meaning that the 
accumulated funds in each individual account would be 
sufficient to pay out benefits to each enrolled worker. 
There would be no implicit or explicit borrowing from 
the rest of government or from the existing component 
of the NPS.
• All investments in the NPA plan accounts would be strictly
regulated, with rules establishing everything from fund 
manager certification to allowable portfolio allocation.
• Finally, all NPA assets would be transformed into monthly 
benefits upon retirement by means of a population-wide
annuitization formula.
The NPA plan could be implemented on different scales. 
The minimal plan would be a pure “add on” to the current
NPS contribution rate of 9 percent. The government would still
follow through on its proposal to raise the NPS contribution
rate to 12.9 percent, but the extra 3.9 percent would go
entirely to the NPA plan. As part of the legislation setting up
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the NPA, the benefit formula for retirement and aged survivor
benefits under the existing component of the NPS would be
reduced to match the limitations of a permanent 9 percent 
of payroll contribution rate. The formula, however, would only
be cut for newly earned benefits. Thus, all workers would still
receive the full benefits they have earned under the NPS to
date. An automatic stabilizer would also be added to the NPS
benefit formula to guarantee long-term solvency in the event
that Korea’s economic or demographic future differs from 
current projections. It is critical that NPA benefits not be 
“borrowed” in any way at the expense of NPS solvency.
A larger NPA plan would be similar to the minimal plan, 
except that here the legislation would make larger reductions
in the current NPS retirement benefit formula, which would
allow larger contributions to flow into the NPA plan accounts.
For example, by reducing the permanent “solvency” contribu-
tion rate to 7 percent, NPA plan contributions could be raised 
to 5.9 percent. If, at the extreme, newly earned NPS benefits
were reduced to zero, then the contribution rate for the 
current NPS system would only need to cover benefits accrued
up to the year of reform. This cost would amount to perhaps 
4 percent of payroll at its peak, allowing all the rest of the 
contributions—at least 8.9 percent of payroll—to flow 
into the NPA plan. 
If the most extreme option is chosen, and existing NPS benefits
are essentially “frozen” at the date of reform, it might make
sense as well to fold the benefits into the new NPA system.
Following the example of reforms in Chile, Hungary, and
Poland, the accrued benefits of workers who have not yet
retired—or perhaps just workers younger than a certain age—
could be credited to their personal accounts, either in the form
of recognition bonds or a pro rata distribution of the reserve
fund. The advantage of this approach is that it avoids a
lengthy transition (75 years or more) for a small residual 
system that would be paying out relatively modest benefits.
Contributions allocated to the personal accounts could be
small or large. Korea’s leaders may consider large personal
accounts politically unrealistic. On the other hand, the larger
they are the greater the burden they would take off future
workers and the higher future retirement incomes would be.
Because personal accounts are a controversial reform option, 
it is worth examining the criticisms that are sometimes leveled
against them.
First of all, it is said that personal accounts funded by a 
payroll tax “carve out” end up undermining the solvency of
the existing system and thus are not really funded at all. This 
is a valid criticism. A pure carve out plan can only achieve a
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rate of return equal to the rate of return on a pay-as-you-go
system. Indeed, for the typical retiree, the return may even 
be worse, since a pay-as-you-go system can cross-subsidize 
the benefits of workers who live to retirement age with the 
benefits foregone by those who die prematurely, while a 
personal accounts system cannot. This is why the CSIS 
proposal avoids a carve out. The NPA plan stands entirely 
on its own, as should the existing NPS. There is no borrowing
and no “clawbacks” or “benefit paybacks” by which one 
system subsidizes the other.
Second, personal accounts are sometimes criticized 
because they are not progressive. But in combination with a
floor-of-protection component (either a means-tested or flat
benefit), the entire NPS system can be as progressive as the
Korean people wish. To build a more progressive system, 
policymakers could simply design a larger floor of protection. 
If some progressivity is also desired for middle-income workers, 
more sophisticated devices are possible—such as a matching
contribution by government into the accounts of low-income
workers that would be gradually reduced at higher 
income levels.
Third, personal accounts are sometimes criticized because 
they subject retirement benefits to the risks of the ups 
and downs of financial markets. Economists largely agree,
however, that these risks can be minimized by regulations 
that require workers to maintain an adequate spread in their
portfolios and to move into fixed-income assets at older ages.
Government could also encourage broad-based index funds.
At the regulatory extreme, it could force workers to choose
among a small number of index funds. The financial risk of a
personal account can never be eliminated entirely, of course,
but neither can the “political risk” of a conventional public
pension system—that is, the risk that future politicians will
change its benefits.
TO PROTECT AGAINST “LONGEVITY RISK,”
PERSONAL ACCOUNT ASSETS WOULD 
BE SUBJECT TO MANDATORY 
ANNUITIZATION UPON RETIREMENT.
Fourth, personal accounts are sometimes criticized for failing
to protect against “longevity risk”—that is, the risk that
retirees will outlive their assets. This too is a valid criticism, 
but only if the accounts allow lump-sum payouts. Longevity
risk can be eliminated by requiring mandatory annuitization.
Some experts say that it would be difficult to annuitize 
personal account assets upon retirement. But annuities are
problematic (and subject to moral hazard and asymmetric
information) only when they are optional. If the personal
accounts are mandatory and longevity risk can be averaged
across the entire population, efficient annuities ought to be
easy to price (as they are under most of today’s universal 
pay-as-you-go systems).
Finally, it is said that personal accounts can damage the 
political legitimacy of a public retirement system and 
undermine the public’s confidence in government. This 
may be true in most of today’s developed countries—where
current social welfare systems are trusted, where payroll tax
compliance is high, and where public retirement systems are
so mature that any movement to personal accounts would
entail enormous transition costs. Yet none of this is true in
Korea. In Korea, opinion polls confirm that levels of trust in 
the current system are very low. Just 10 percent of Koreans
think “positively” about the NPS, and by 69 to 17 percent
they say that “an individual pension” would be a better deal.22
In Korea, payroll tax compliance is low—a fact which further
feeds the distrust by persuading much of the public that the
system is being gamed. And in Korea, the public retirement
system is immature and therefore easy to integrate with a 
system of personally owned accounts.
FUNDED RETIREMENT SYSTEMS 
HAVE DECISIVE ADVANTAGES OVER 
PAY-AS-YOU-GO SYSTEMS.
Funded retirement systems have decisive advantages over 
pay-as-you-go systems. While the long-term rate of return 
that workers can earn in a pay-as-you-go system is limited 
to the rate of economic growth, the rate of return in a fully 
funded system is equal to the rate of return to capital, which 
is typically much higher, especially when the population is
aging rapidly. Funded systems can thus offer participants 
higher benefits at any given contribution rate than pay-as-
you-go systems can.
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A reformed NPS with a personal accounts component would
not only improve rates of return, but also improve rates of
compliance and participation. Given the government’s weak
enforcement capability, the current system’s redistributive 
benefit formula is an invitation to gaming. Under the reformed
system, redistribution would be handled entirely through the
floor of protection. Within the personal accounts, benefits 
paid out would be precisely proportional to contributions paid
in. The fact that the accounts are personal property would 
give workers a further incentive to participate. Most Koreans
today view their NPS contributions as a tax. If they knew that
they were accumulating personally owned savings, they would
be more enthusiastic about joining the system. Although 
gaps in coverage would surely remain, the problem would 
be more tractable.
A FULLY FUNDED RETIREMENT SYSTEM 
WOULD HELP BROADEN AND DEEPEN 
KOREA’S CAPITAL MARKETS.
There are other advantages as well. A fully funded system
would help to maintain adequate rates of savings and invest-
ment, which is one of the greatest challenges facing an aging 
Korea. It would also help to speed the development of Korea’s
capital markets. In many developed countries, including the
United States, funded pensions have played a crucial role in
broadening and deepening capital markets. As Korea’s pension
funds grow, so would the size and liquidity of its capital mar-
kets. Along with professional fund management would come
greater accountability, transparency, and long-term returns.
Although the NPS is now in principle partially funded, it is
unclear how effective the system’s annual surpluses have been
at raising national savings. A fully funded system that is 
privately managed and invested would eliminate the risk that
the government’s fiscal policy will end up undoing the savings
of Korean workers. It would also eliminate another risk—
namely, that of political interference in the private economy.
Minister of Health and Welfare Simin Rhyu recently caused a
stir when he suggested that the National Pension Fund would
“not sit back and watch” as foreign companies take over large 
domestic enterprises.23 According to Korea Development
Institute scholar Woochan Kim, “politics-free management of
the fund, unfortunately, seems to be nearly impossible at this
point.”24 In the long run, a large government run reserve fund
may simply not be consistent with an open and globalizing 
Korean economy.
The benefits of successful reform would be enormous—
higher retirement incomes, lower costs, and greater security.
Under the government’s reform proposal, which would raise
the NPS contribution rate to 12.9 percent and cut its nominal
replacement rate to 50 percent, the system would only be able
to pay benefits until 2065, even assuming the reserve fund is
genuinely saved. After 2065, the contribution rate would have
to be raised to over 30 percent, imposing a catastrophic bur-
den on future workers. At the same 12.9 percent contribution
level, the NPA reform could deliver the 60 percent nominal
replacement rate that the NPS now offers but cannot afford—
and do so forever. Contributions would never again have to 
be raised or benefits cut. At a 16 percent contribution rate,
the reformed system could actually deliver the genuine 
60 percent of final salary replacement rate that is entirely
beyond the reach of the current system.25
A workable personal accounts system would of course have 
to be underpinned by a broad and sturdy floor of protection.
While building this floor will require a significant up-front
investment, Korea will eventually incur the cost one way or 
another. The government is already proposing a significant
expansion of means-tested old-age benefits. And in the future,
if today’s inadequate NPS is left unreformed, the pressure on
public welfare budgets can only increase as family support 
networks weaken and the number of elderly grows. On the
other hand, if most Koreans are contributing to a national 
system of personal accounts, future retirement incomes will be
higher and elderly poverty lower. In the long term, the cost of
the floor of protection may be no greater—and indeed, could
be substantially less—than the cost of the status quo.
Still, the government may need to find new fiscal resources.
The outsized pensions for government employees, private
school teachers, and the armed forces—Korea’s real “high
benefit” pension systems—are one obvious place to look 
for savings. The plan for government employees offers 
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25 These calculations assume a real rate of return of 4.0 percent after administrative costs.
participants a pension that replaces 70 percent of final salary
after 30 years of service, and is indexed to wages for life. 
The plans for teachers and the armed forces are similar. So
generous are these benefits that, even though the NPS covers
thirteen times as many workers, its cost in 2050 is projected 
to be just two-and-one-half times as great. Trimming back
Korea’s special government pension schemes would not only
be good for the taxpayer, but might also go a long way
toward restoring public confidence in the overall fairness 
of Korea’s retirement system.
Now is the time to act. Because the NPS is still immature, 
it is possible to fund a personal accounts system while still 
preserving all of the benefits earned by workers to date. 
The system’s unfunded liability is now just 33 percent of GDP,
and this “closed group” calculation assumes that all of today’s
workers will continue to earn new benefits.26 The system’s
“termination liability”—that is, benefits accrued to date minus
the existing reserve fund —is perhaps just half that, or about
15 percent of GDP. These are not large liabilities for an econo-
my that is now growing at 4 to 5 percent per year.
THE LONGER REFORM IS DELAYED, 
THE MORE DIFFICULT IT WILL BECOME.
The longer reform is delayed, the more difficult reform will
become. Korea needs to avoid the mistakes of the developed
countries and begin to transition, at least partially, to a fully
funded public pension system before it is too late. Most of
these countries now have unfunded public pension liabilities
that exceed 100 percent of GDP—and some have unfunded
liabilities that exceed 200 percent. It is too late for them 
to transition, even partially, to such a system without huge 
economic and political cost. But, it is not too late for Korea.
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Transitioning to a more adequate and affordable retirement
system is a necessary part of an overall strategy for confronting
the age wave, but it is not the only part. Korea will also need
to bring about even more fundamental changes in its society
and culture if it is to meet the needs of the old while ensuring
a future of rising living standards for the young. This is not a
question of accepting or rejecting traditional social and cultural
norms. The task, rather, is to reshape those norms to meet 
the challenges of an aging society. Among the most important
of these challenges are encouraging longer work lives, 
helping women balance jobs and babies, and caring for 
a fast-growing number of frail elders.
THE CHALLENGE OF LONGER WORK LIVES 
AND A GRAYING WORKFORCE
The central economic challenge of an aging society is how 
to afford the growing resource transfer from workers to 
nonworking retirees. There are two main ways to limit this
burden. One is to rely more heavily on funded retirement 
systems, and the other is to encourage higher retirement 
ages and longer work lives. The second strategy has a double 
benefit, since it not only reduces the number of retired 
beneficiaries, but also increases the number of workers and
producers. Even apart from the challenge of supporting 
tomorrow’s much larger elderly population, longer work 
lives will thus be crucial for maintaining economic growth 
in an aging Korea.
LONGER WORK LIVES ARE CRUCIAL 
FOR MAINTAINING ECONOMIC GROWTH 
IN AN AGING KOREA.
The current retirement age in Korea is extraordinarily low—
typically in the mid-fifties for workers with regular employment
contracts. According to a Korea Labor Institute survey, 76 per-
cent of businesses have a mandatory retirement age in effect,
and among firms with 300 or more employees the share is 96
percent. Just 3.7 percent of regular employees at medium and
large firms are 55 or older.27
LESS THAN 4 PERCENT OF REGULAR 
EMPLOYEES AT MEDIUM AND LARGE 
FIRMS ARE AGED 55 OR OLDER.
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27 Jiyeun Chang, “Labor Market Policies in the Era of Population Aging: the Korean Case,” paper presented at the Seminar on Labor Market Policies in an Aging Era: Country Cases
(Seoul; October 23, 2003).
To be sure, overall labor-force participation rates for older
adults are high by developed-country standards. Even after 
age 65, 30 percent of Koreans still work, compared with 
20 percent of Japanese, 15 percent of Americans, and just 
3 percent of  Germans. Very few of the elderly, however, 
are employed in high-productivity or high-growth sectors of
Korea’s economy. A huge share of working elders—54 percent
in 2001—are farmers whose jobs will not exist a decade from
now. Overall, 58 percent of elderly workers are self-employed,
while another 39 percent are short-term irregular employees,
often working at low-skilled jobs at small firms. (See Figure
16.) There are few opportunities for more highly skilled older
workers in a society in which, in the words of one expert, “it is
nearly impossible to find a new job after 40.”28
As Korea ages, the current culture of early retirement 
will become a mounting burden on formal and informal 
old-age support systems—and a growing drag on the 
economy. Employers need to be persuaded that workers can
remain valuable resources to the company long after the 
traditional retirement age. Although attitudes may begin to
change on their own as younger workers become relatively
more scarce in the years to come, government policy will 
need to help the shift.
The government is taking steps to encourage longer work
lives. It recently set employment quotas for older workers and
offers subsidies to firms that hire or retain them. But with rates
of older worker employment still vanishingly small at medium
and large firms, experts agree that more fundamental reforms
are required.
KOREA’S RIGID SENIORITY PAY SYSTEM 
MAY BE THE SINGLE BIGGEST OBSTACLE 
TO LATER RETIREMENT AGES.
The place to start is to overhaul Korea’s rigid seniority pay 
system. The system’s lock-step pay and promotion schedules
make it expensive to retain older workers and discourage 
hiring new ones. They can also interact as a multiplier with 
the severance pay system, which is “progressive” at many
firms—meaning that the employer’s contribution rate rises
along with worker tenure. Although the seniority pay system 
is deeply embedded in Korea’s workplace culture, employers
and employees are beginning to question its economic 
rationale. One sensible solution would be to replace it with a
“wage peak” system, in which companies and unions would
be allowed to negotiate lower pay for older workers in
exchange for job security.
There are other reforms that could help as well. Workers 
past the age of 59 do not currently contribute to the National
Pension System or earn new wage credits toward their 
pensions. Extending coverage to all workers, regardless of age,
would send the right signal to employers and employees alike.
The government should also consider raising the minimum age
for benefit eligibility under the new corporate pension system,
which was set at 55 to facilitate early retirement, in tandem
with the scheduled increase in the NPS eligibility age. In the
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end, however, these changes may only have a limited 
impact unless the government is also prepared to abolish
mandatory retirement ages and enforce robust anti-age 
discrimination laws.
KOREA NEEDS TO MOVE BEYOND 
THE TRADITIONAL “THREE-BOX LIFECYCLE” 
OF EDUCATION, WORK, AND RETIREMENT.
Whether or not Korean workers retire later, the ongoing 
inversion of the age pyramid ensures that tomorrow’s typical
worker will be much older than today’s. Yet even as the 
average age of Korea’s workforce rises, the rate at which new
technologies are introduced and old skills become obsolete is
increasing. To meet the challenge of a graying workforce,
Korea will have to move beyond the traditional “three-box 
lifecycle” of education, work, and retirement. While students
are still at school, educators will have to prepare them to be
self-starters responsible for maintaining their own skills in an
economy in which many may have to change jobs and even
careers several times. This in turn will require far-reaching
reform of an educational system notorious for its reliance on
rote learning and its emphasis on intellectual conformity.
Educators will also have to develop lifelong “distance 
learning” and continuing education programs tailored to 
current workers who need to upgrade their skills.
Korean companies have traditionally assumed much of the
responsibility for worker training. In recent years, however, 
the unraveling of the lifetime employment system and the
explosion in the number of short-term irregular employees 
has begun to undercut incentives for employers to invest 
in Korea’s increasingly mobile workforce. It may fall to 
government to step in with viable alternatives.
THE CHALLENGE OF BALANCING 
JOBS AND BABIES 
Making it easier for women to balance jobs and babies may 
be even more critical for an aging Korea than encouraging
longer work lives. On the one hand, Korea needs more
women in the workforce to boost employment and keep 
the economy growing. On the other hand, it needs more 
children to slow its gathering population decline.
As it is, Korea is having difficulty reconciling the two needs. 
It has an ostensibly gender-blind educational system designed
to prepare women for entrance into the workforce. As of
2005, 99 percent of women aged 25 to 29 had completed 
at least high school and 40 percent had completed college—
graduation rates that are actually higher than the comparable
rates for men. Yet at the same time, Korea also has a
Confucian family culture that encourages traditional sex roles
in marriage and a male-dominated work culture that tends to
view jobs and motherhood as incompatible. Among married
women under age 45, 61 percent say that they quit their jobs
after getting married.29
KOREA HAS BOTH THE LOWEST 
FERTILITY RATE IN THE DEVELOPED WORLD
AND ONE OF THE LOWEST RATES OF FEMALE
LABOR-FORCE PARTICIPATION.
The result is in many ways the worst of both worlds. Korea
now has a lower fertility rate than any developed country and
one of the lowest rates of female labor-force participation—
60 percent for women aged 25 to 54 versus 75 percent in 
the United States and 76 percent in the European Union. Even
among highly educated women, there is a wide gap between
Korea and other high-income countries. Only 58 percent of
college-educated women are employed in Korea, compared
with an average of 77 percent for the OECD countries.
THE SHARE OF WOMEN WHO SAY CHILDREN
ARE “NECESSARY” FELL FROM 90 PERCENT 
IN 1991 TO 58 PERCENT IN 2000.
Increasingly, younger women are reacting to the impasse by
choosing jobs over marriage and motherhood. Although still
low by the standards of most developed countries, rates of
labor-force participation among younger women have been
rising rapidly over the past decade. Meanwhile, far fewer are
getting married. The share of women aged 20 to 24 who are
single increased from 80 percent in 1990 to 94 percent in
2005, while the share aged 25 to 29 who are single increased
from 22 to 59 percent. (See Figure 17.) Just 13 percent of sin-
gle women now say that marriage is a “necessity.”30 Attitudes
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toward motherhood have undergone a parallel transformation.
The share of women who say it is “necessary” to have 
children fell from 90 percent in 1991 to 58 percent in 2000.31
Even among married women, the share saying that having
children is “quite necessary” has plummeted, from 90 
percent in 1991 to 23 percent in 2005.32
Some of the recent decline in marriage rates is attributable 
to rising insecurity in the wake of the 1997 Asian financial 
crisis. The surge in youth unemployment, together with the
dramatic rise in irregular employment, undermined men’s 
traditional role as breadwinners just as women were becoming
more financially independent. Many young men may have
been permanently shut out of regular employment, since 
rigid age-based hiring rules apply not only to the old but to
the young as well. As the “cursed class” of 1998 learned,
once you fall off the job escalator you can’t climb back on. 
All of this fundamentally changed the marriage market.
Most experts agree, however, that the roots of the problem
run much deeper. If Korea wants to have both higher female
labor-force participation rates and higher fertility rates, its 
leaders will need to reach out to employers, combat stereo-
types of women in the workforce and the family, and 
persuade society as a whole that productive careers for
women are not incompatible with raising families.
The experience of other developed countries offers some 
useful lessons. Although it is common wisdom that more
working women means fewer babies, the common wisdom
turns out to be wrong. In fact, across the developed world, it
is the countries with the highest rates of female labor-force
participation that have the highest fertility rates. In some of
these countries, like France and Sweden, society heavily 
subsidizes childrearing—both directly through government
cash benefits to families with children and tax-financed 
day care, and indirectly by mandating that employers 
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offer expectant mothers generous paid maternity leave and 
job guarantees. In other counties, however, state support for 
families is minimal. The United States offers few government
benefits or workplace guarantees, yet has both a high rate of
female labor-force participation and a high fertility rate—in
fact, the highest in the developed world. What all of these
countries have in common is that, over time, attitudes and
expectations about the social role of women have changed 
in ways that support—or at least do not stigmatize—their
decision to have both jobs and babies. More traditional 
societies like Japan, Italy, and Spain find themselves in the
same bind as Korea.
When demographers survey women about their family plans,
they typically ask two questions: What is the ideal number of
children and how many children do you expect to have. In
most countries, the answer to the first question is somewhat
higher than the second. The gap in Korea, however, is both
large and growing. In the most recent survey in 2000, Korean
women in their childbearing years said that the ideal number
of children was 2.2, but that, on average, they only expected
to have 1.4.33 This birth gap is both a hopeful sign that a turn-
around in fertility is possible—and an indication of how great
the obstacles are that must be overcome.
THE GOVERNMENT HAS SHIFTED 
COURSE AND IS NOW ACTIVELY PURSUING 
A PRONATALIST AGENDA.
After decades of seeking to limit births, the Korean govern-
ment has decisively shifted course and is now actively pursuing
a “pronatalist” agenda. Up to the mid-1990s, the government
penalized large families by limiting the child income tax deduc-
tion to their first two children. It also required parents to pay
more out-of-pocket for each extra child’s health-care bills.
Today the government offers a whole series of generous
income tax breaks for families with children, from birth
allowances to educational expense deductions, all available
without limit on the number of children who can be claimed.
The government has also proposed granting workers who
have two or more children additional wage credits in 
calculating their NPS pension benefits.
The government’s five-year plan for responding to the 
aging challenge also includes direct subsidies to help families
cover the rising cost of educating children. While this is a 
concern for families in most developed countries, nowhere is
the burden heavier than in Korea. Middle-class families spend
small fortunes on English-only nursery schools for toddlers and
private academies and cram courses for high school students.
The goal is a high score on the make-or-break college entrance
exams that open the door to Seoul National University, Korea
University, and Yonsei—the so-called SKY Triumvirate—
and largely determine future career success. For households
headed by adults in their forties, those most likely to have 
students in high school, spending on education now accounts
for a remarkable 18 percent of total household consumption.
The government’s new pronatalist agenda represents a big
step in the right direction. If it is to work, however, it will 
have to be accompanied by deeper changes in prevailing social
and cultural attitudes. Even generous child tax breaks and 
subsidies may not make much difference to most of today’s
young women if having a child means losing their job—or if
keeping their job means an obligatory “second shift” at home,
without any assistance from their husbands. The opportunity
cost of motherhood will continue to remain too high. In
today’s environment, it is hardly surprising that the govern-
ment’s recent “1-2-3” public relations campaign, designed 
to persuade women to have a first child in their first year 
of marriage and a second child by age 30, elicited much
amusement among Korean youth.
KOREA’S TRADITIONAL WORKPLACE 
AND FAMILY CULTURE MAY BE PUSHING 
IT INTO A DEMOGRAPHIC FREE FALL.
The collision of Korea’s traditional workplace and family 
culture with the aspirations of the rising generation of 
educated and independent young women is pushing Korea
into a demographic free fall—what Seunggwon Baek,
Assistant Secretary for Public Information, calls “a downhill
road without any brakes.”34 In the end, resolving Korea’s
“gender problem” may be even more important than 
resolving its pension problem, for in the long run there can be
no solution to Korea’s aging challenge at a 1.1 fertility rate.
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THE CHALLENGE OF CARING 
FOR THE FRAIL ELDERLY
From time immemorial in Korea, the care of the frail and 
disabled elderly has fallen to the family. Even today, the vast
majority of Korean elders who are in need of assistance with
basic activities of daily living are cared for informally by rela-
tives, most typically their daughters-in-law. As of 2002, barely
1 percent of the population aged 65 and over received public
long-term care assistance of any kind, despite government
estimates that as many as 15 percent are in poor enough
health to need it. The share of the elderly living in nursing
homes is even smaller—just 0.3 percent.35
BARELY 1 PERCENT OF THE 
ELDERLY RECEIVE PUBLIC LONG-TERM 
ASSISTANCE OF ANY KIND.
Korea’s informal care arrangements have worked well for 
centuries because the number of frail elders has been relatively
small and their children have been numerous and dutiful. The
ethic of filial piety is weakening, however, and demography is
about to turn the traditional population pyramid on its head. 
It is not just a question of the overall growth in the number 
of elderly, but of a phenomenon demographers call the 
“aging of the aged.” From 2005 to 2050, the number of
“young old” aged 65 to 79 is projected to increase by 172
percent, while the number of “old-old” aged 80 and over 
is projected to increase by 807 percent. While today just 15
percent of all Korean elders are aged 80 and over, that share is
due to rise to 22 percent by 2030 and to 38 percent by 2050.
(See Figure 18.) What makes this trend so ominous is that the
per capita incidence of morbidity and disability rises steeply
with age, even among the elderly themselves.
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THE NUMBER OF KOREANS AGED 80 
AND OVER IS DUE TO GROW BY 807 PERCENT
BETWEEN 2005 AND 2050.
The challenge of providing long-term care for tomorrow’s frail
elders will be especially great in the countryside, which is aging
much more rapidly than Korea’s urban centers. As Korea has
urbanized and industrialized, young people have abandoned
their villages for the cities, often leaving the old behind. As of
2001, just 37 percent of rural elders lived with their children,
compared with 58 percent of urban elders. With the country-
side failing to repopulate itself, the shortage of family care-
givers can only grow more acute in the future. Young men,
experiencing more and more difficulty in finding Korean wives,
are turning to the foreign bride market. In rural Korea in 2005,
four out of ten men’s marriages were to foreign brides, mostly
from South Asia—a remarkable statistic for a culture that has
always stressed ethnic homogeneity.36
THE “AGING OF THE AGED” WILL 
PLACE AN ENORMOUS NEW BURDEN 
ON FAMILY SUPPORT NETWORKS.
The coming explosion in the number of old-old threatens to
place a heavy new burden on tomorrow’s young women,
urban and rural alike, and make it even harder for them to
balance work and family. After all, while it is the eldest son
who has the duty to care for his aged parents in traditional
Korean culture, it is the daughter-in-law who does the actual
caring. Just as worrisome, many of tomorrow’s elders may
have no daughter-in-law at all—and not just because marriage
rates are falling. As birthrates dropped beneath replacement in
the 1980s and 1990s, the traditional preference of Korean
families for sons translated into a dearth of baby girls. The sex
ratio at birth in Korea peaked at 116.5 boy babies for every
100 girls babies in 1990, far above the 105 ratio in a normal
population, and remained high through the middle of the
decade.37 While it has since fallen dramatically, thanks in part
to a major government campaign stressing the value of
daughters, yesterday’s baby girl shortage will exacerbate
tomorrow’s caregiver shortage for decades to come.
The government is trying to fill the gap. In 2006, it announced
the launch of a new Elderly Care Insurance program. Modeled
on Japan’s long-term care system, the program, which is
scheduled to begin operating in 2008, is a universal entitle-
ment financed through a combination of payroll taxes, 
government subsidies, and beneficiary cost-sharing. 
The government intends to phase in coverage gradually, 
not just to limit costs but also to allow time to construct a
long-term care infrastructure that is now almost entirely 
lacking. Eventually, however, the plan is supposed to pay for
both home care and nursing home services for all elders 
who meet its disability test.
KOREA’S EXTENDED FAMILIES ARE ONE 
OF ITS GREATEST ASSETS IN CONFRONTING
THE AGE WAVE.
There is no doubt that the new program meets a critical 
need. The question is whether it is affordable. The danger 
with universal long-term care entitlements is that, over time,
they may end up shifting the entire burden of caring for the
frail elderly to public budgets. Korea’s extended families,
though under mounting stress, are still one of its greatest
assets in confronting the age wave. There are ways to lend
them critically needed support without undermining their
incentive to provide care—for instance, by combining a floor
of means-tested assistance with “respite” care benefits that
pay for temporary substitute caregivers so family caregivers 
can take time off.
The government may be hoping that Koreans’ strong 
cultural preference for family-based care, together with 
the program’s cost-sharing requirements, will limit demand 
for the new long-term care benefit. If so, the experience of
Japan offers a sobering warning. The same cultural preference 
existed there when it introduced its long-term care entitlement
in 2000, yet costs have far exceeded initial projections.
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Within living memory, the Koreans have proven themselves 
to be a people of extraordinary resilience, resourcefulness, and
will to succeed. In the 1940s and 1950s, they defeated and
deterred powerful invaders. In the 1960s and 1970s, they 
built a mighty engine of national economic growth. In the
1980s, they invested in a quality system of universal secondary
education. In the 1990s, they ushered in a vibrant democracy
with protected civil liberties. And, more recently, they have
become cutting-edge innovators in the popular culture, 
pioneers of mass wireless communication, and inventors at
the global frontiers of infotech, biotech, and nanotech.
LEARNING HOW TO THRIVE AS IT 
AGES IS THE GREATEST CHALLENGE FACING
KOREA IN THE 21ST CENTURY.
The very success of this transformation from traditional to
modern and now (perhaps) to postmodern has set the stage
for the next great challenge facing the Korean people: how 
to maintain their national prosperity while also aging as fast 
as they have been developing. To be sure, Korea faces other
national challenges over the coming century, from negotiating
the shifting geopolitical tides of the East Asian region to 
staying globally competitive in a “winner-take-all” era of 
trade and capital flows. Nothing, however, is likely to require
as much creativity and hard work as learning how to continue
to thrive as a much older society.
BY 2050, THERE WILL BE MORE 
KOREANS TURNING 90 EACH YEAR 
THAN BEING BORN.
Imagine, by 2050, a Korea in which half of all adults are 
over age 60 and in which more people celebrate their 90th
birthday each year than are born. Imagine a workforce whose
size is shrinking by 10 percent every seven years. Imagine 
voters and leaders struggling to figure out how to find at 
least one taxpayer to support each retiree. Now imagine the
difficulties Korea will face if it fails to prepare for these fiscal,
economic, and social challenges. Or, conversely, imagine the
opportunities Korea will enjoy if it does. Some may object that
these projections, which we believe are based on conservative
assumptions, are not foreordained. The future may turn out
differently. Indeed it may, but it is hard to see how this will
C O N C L U S I O N
happen unless Korea takes deliberate steps to change course
and to steer its future along a different path.
To steer a different path, we argue in this report that Korea
needs to move decisively in three broad areas: retirement 
policies, workplace policies, and family policies.
KOREA NEEDS TO BOOST FUNDED PENSION
SAVINGS TO ENSURE THE RETIREMENT 
SECURITY OF TOMORROW’S ELDERLY.
In the first area, we outline a simple three-step reform 
strategy. The first step is to enact an efficient and universal
floor of protection for low-income elders, either as a means-
tested program or as a universal flat benefit. The second 
step is to transform the NPS by combining it with a mandatory
funded system of add-on defined-contribution accounts that
would be individually owned but strictly regulated. Compared
to the current NPS, such a system would be regarded as fairer,
encourage much higher rates of participation, and—most
importantly—generate higher benefit levels at lower contribu-
tion rates. The third step is to encourage (and perhaps require)
businesses to transition from internally funded severance pay
benefits for retired workers toward externally funded pension
systems. This too would greatly improve the incomes and 
security of tomorrow’s retirees.
KOREAN BUSINESSES MUST COME 
TO VIEW OLDER WORKERS AS A VALUABLE
RESOURCE LONG PAST AGE 55 OR 60.
In its workplace policies, Korea needs to encourage medium
and large firms to phase out their mandatory retirement 
rules and rigid seniority wage system. Instead, businesses 
must begin to view older workers as a valuable resource who
have the potential, with lifelong learning and communities of
practice, to generate ample value-added long past age 55 or
60. As early as 2025, fully one-third of Korea’s adults will be
over age 60, most still in excellent health and few (by then)
still self-employed on farms. There is simply no way Korea 
can age successfully while leaving this vast army of veteran
workers unemployed, absorbing public income as dependents
rather than generating income as taxpayers. If business hesi-
tates, government will have to force action. The stakes here
are simply too large.
KOREAN SOCIETY MUST TRANSCEND 
THE FALSE DICHOTOMY BETWEEN WOMEN
HAVING BABIES AND WOMEN HAVING JOBS.
In its family policies, Korea must transcend the false 
dichotomy between women having babies and women having
jobs. In fact, Korean women have not been doing much of
either. Chafing under a strict and traditional definition of 
family duties, today’s young women are delaying marriage 
and are reluctant to have children even after marriage—
pushing Korea’s fertility rate to the lowest in the world. Many
instead are pursuing careers. But even here they often find
that businesses and families do not welcome them as 
professionals once they become mothers—causing female
labor-force participation to be lower in Korea than in many
other countries with much higher fertility rates. While 
government can and should implement pronatal and 
pro-employment incentives, social attitudes will have to
change before family behavior shifts decisively. Above all, 
the country must begin to regard women—in their roles 
as mothers, workers, and caregivers—as critical assets in 
an aging Korea.
Because the age wave is projected to hit so soon and so 
quickly, Korea cannot afford to delay preparing for this 
dramatic demographic transformation. Once the wave arrives,
it may be too late to prepare. On the other hand, because
Korea today remains relatively young, an effective policy 
agenda may be easier to implement. Unlike most other 
high-income nations, for example, Korea has an immature
public pension system that has yet to accrue large unfunded
liabilities to current workers. This will make reforming the 
system fiscally less costly and politically less troublesome.
In any event, preparing for an aging future means anticipating
future needs that may not yet be urgent, such as designing 
an efficient long-term care program and encouraging the
retention of older workers. Though few Koreans today regard
savings as a problem, it would be prudent to anticipate a rapid
decline in Korea’s savings rate once today’s large middle-aged
population retires. Boosting national savings, both to counter-
act this demographic shift and to prepare the economy for
emerging public-sector deficits, must therefore be an impor-
tant objective of Korea’s overall reform strategy.
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Beyond the demographic projections and possible policy
responses, a final question must be asked: What sort of
national aging strategy are the Koreans themselves, both as
leaders and voters, likely to favor in the coming decades? It
helps to put a human face on this question by looking at it
through the eyes of today’s living generations.
To begin with, there is the elder “Korean War Generation,”
who ruled the nation with an authoritarian hand for 40 years,
from 1962 until 2003, until a seismic political realignment
removed them from power. They have always stood for 
economic development, civic discipline, traditional Confucian
culture, and strong national defense. Growing old with 
their numerous children, who were born in an era of high 
fertility, they are leaving the aging challenge for younger 
leaders to tackle.
There is the “Cold War Generation” of President Moohyun
Roh, now in their late fifties and sixties, who are trying 
cautiously to manage the rise of a more open political system
and a more democratic culture. They are acutely aware of the
coming age wave, yet feel torn between traditional norms 
and more innovative solutions. As leaders, they have been
responsible for most of the policy responses to date, which
mostly focus on repairing existing institutions like the 
National Pension System.
AS KOREA’S “GENERATION 386” 
ASSUMES LEADERSHIP OVER THE NEXT
DECADE, IT MAY FAVOR BOLDER AND 
MORE VISIONARY REFORMS.
There is the so-called “Generation 386,” now in their 
mid-thirties to early fifties, who in their youth spearheaded 
a passionate political protest movement and who today are
loudest in their demands for an overhaul of national defense
policy (so that it tilts less to the United States), of economic
policy (to purge the influence of the chaebols), and of the
Confucian family (to make it less strict and patriarchal). As
workers today entering midlife, the 386ers include Korea’s
largest postwar birth cohorts. When they begin retiring,
Korea’s age wave will hit with full force, making them the 
generation with the most to lose if the system breaks under
their impact. As voters, they will be more apt to understand
and embrace broader social reforms (regarding retirement age
and the role of women) that older generations have avoided—
perhaps de-emphasizing filial piety and employer benevolence
and stressing generational equity and stewardship. As 386ers
assume national leadership over the next decade, they may
propose reforms that are bolder and more visionary than 
those seen to date.
Finally, there is Korea’s emerging “Generation X,” still in their
twenties and early thirties, who are exploring the cutting edge
of a newly affluent and entrepreneurial society. Thanks to their
energy and creativity, Korea now defines the frontier of digital
and cultural “cool” throughout East Asia. Three Generation X
traits could profoundly shape Korea’s response to the aging
challenge. The first is their penchant for free-agent market
behavior and a distrust of large institutions. The second is 
their hostility toward lifetime careers. The third is their 
ambivalence about traditional Confucian family expectations,
as epitomized by today’s unattached singles. Though Korea’s
Generation X will not become national leaders until well after
the age wave has arrived, their attitudes may facilitate some of
the policy responses suggested in this report. Generation X’s
market orientation, for instance, should favor funded 
retirement savings and (perhaps) higher retirement ages.
Similarly, their preference for more modular careers may 
facilitate new roles for women by making it easier for them 
to move in and out of employment.
A VERY OLD KOREA CAN STILL 
BE A VERY PROSPEROUS KOREA IF ALL 
GENERATIONS WORK TOGETHER.
We are convinced that by the time this rising generation 
reaches old age, no one will see a contradiction between a
Korea that is both very prosperous and very old. By the middle
of the 21st century, if all of Korea’s generations work together,
no one will believe that a person cannot be both productive
and old, that a woman cannot have both a job 
and children, or that a public pension system cannot be both
adequate and affordable. This will be a Korea in which 
generational equity will not just be honored in principle, but 
in practice—embodied in the renewed political and social 
institutions of a country which will once again have shown 
the world how to turn challenge into opportunity.
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In researching and writing this report, CSIS consulted dozens
of specialized studies on the implications of population aging
for Korea’s economy, society, and of course, public and private
retirement systems. The recent three-year research project on
aging coordinated by the Korea Development Institute (KDI)
proved especially valuable.1 This note, however, makes no
attempt to review this rich secondary literature. Its purpose is
more limited—to orient the reader to the basic data sources
used in preparing the report.
Most Korean demographic data cited in the report are 
compiled by the Korea National Statistical Office (KNSO) and
published in the Korean Statistical Information System (KOSIS)
database, available online at http://kosis.nso.go.kr/. These data
include total population, population by age, fertility rates (total
and age specific), life expectancy at birth, and average age of
first marriage. Data on living arrangements of the elderly are
from special studies by KNSO and the Korea Institute for
Health and Social Affairs (KIHASA).2 Data on educational 
attainment by age and sex are from unpublished tabulations
provided by the Korea Statistical Association. All demographic
projections for Korea refer to KNSO’s 2006 baseline population
scenario.3
Demographic data for other countries are from the UN
Population Division and are published in World Population
Prospects.4 Projections refer to the UN’s 2004 “constant 
fertility” scenario, which is broadly consistent with the KNSO
baseline scenario for Korea. CSIS believes that the UN’s 
constant fertility scenario constitutes a better baseline for 
the developed countries than the more commonly cited
“medium variant” scenario, which arbitrarily assumes a 
convergence in fertility rates. 
Basic economic data cited in the report come from standard
Korean and international sources. Data on Korean GDP,
wages, household income, and the government sector are
from KNSO’s KOSIS database. Data on the Korean labor force
(by sector, type of employment, age, and sex) are from the
Ministry of Labor and are published in its Labor Statistics
Yearbook. Data on Korean savings rates (national, household,
and personal) are from the OECD and are published in its
Economic Outlook. Data for international comparisons of GDP
and GDP per capita (in exchange rate and purchasing power
parity dollars) are from the World Bank’s World Development
Indicators. Data for international comparisons of educational
attainment and labor-force participation rates (by age, sex, and
educational attainment) are from the OECD and are published
in OECD.Stat database, available online at
http://stats.oecd.org/WBOS/.
Basic historical data on Korea’s National Pension System (NPS),
including participants, beneficiaries, revenues and expendi-
tures, and reserve fund finances, are complied by the National
Pension Service and published in its National Pension Statistical
Yearbook. Data on active contributors, however, are from 
special tabulations prepared for the National Joint Convention
for Low Fertility and Aging Society Agenda.5 Data on the 
special public pension schemes for government employees, 
private school teachers, and the military are from KNSO’s
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1 Hyungpyo Moon ed., Socio-Economic Impacts of Population Aging and Policy Issues, vols. 1, 2, and 3 (in Korean) (Korea Development Institute; 2004, 2005, and 2006).
2 Doosub Kim and Cheongseok Kim eds., The Population of Korea (KNSO; 2004); and Kyunghee Chung, “The 2004 Survey on the Living Profile and Welfare Service Needs of Older
Persons: Results and Policy Implications,” (in Korean) Health and Welfare Forum (March 2005).
3 Population Projections for Korea: 2005-2050 (in Korean) (KNSO; November 2006).
4 World Population Prospects: The 2004 Revision, 2 volumes (UN Population Division; 2005).
5 Background material prepared for the Meetings of the National Joint Convention for Low Fertility and Aging Policy Agenda (Seoul; October 20-21, 2006).
Korea National Statistical Yearbook, the National Joint
Convention for Low Fertility and Aging Society Agenda, and
the Korea Institute of Public Finance’s (KIPF) Social Indicators
for Korea database, available online at http://www.kipf.re.kr/.
Data on the National Health Insurance System and govern-
ment social assistance programs, including the Medical Aid
Program and the National Basic Livelihood Security Program,
are from the Korea National Statistical Yearbook and KIPF’s
Social Indicators for Korea database.
Data on the severance pay system are collected in periodic
supplements to the Ministry of Labor’s Survey of the
Economically Active Population, as well as special surveys by
the Korea Labor Institute that are cited in the footnotes to the
text. Data on the new corporate pension system are published
in the Financial Supervisory Service’s “Weekly Newsletter” and
the Ministry of Labor’s “Monthly Labor Statistics.”
It may be helpful to give a word of explanation about the
long-term cost projections for old-age benefit programs cited
in the report. Whenever we discuss NPS expenditures as a
share of workers’ taxable earnings or projected dates of NPS
“insolvency,” we use the official government projections 
prepared by the National Pension Development Committee
(NPDC) in 2003.6 The published NPDC report, however, does
not include projections of NPS expenditures as a share of GDP.
For current-law GDP share projections for the NPS, we use 
simulations by KDI that are consistent with the NPDC payroll
share projections.7 For CSIS’ “no benefit gap” projection, we
adjust the current-law projection to reflect the following
assumption changes. First, that the active contribution rate
among NPS covered workers will rise from roughly 60 to 90
percent and that two-thirds of the increase will be translated
into new benefit awards. And second, that the system’s actual
replacement rates (initial benefits as a percent of final salary)
will match its nominal replacement rates.
There are no recent long-term government projections for 
the special pension schemes for government employees, 
private school teachers, and the armed forces. For these 
programs, as well as for welfare programs for the elderly, 
we use unpublished projection data shared with CSIS by Dr.
Joonook Choi, Director of the Public Finance Research Division
at the Korea Institute of Public Finance (KIPF).
There are also no official long-term government projections for
public health-care and long-term care spending on the elderly.
CSIS developed its own projections based on the following
assumptions. For both health care and long-term care, we
assume constant rates of age-adjusted per capita utilization.
For health care, we also assume that the rate of growth in 
real age-adjusted per capita costs will exceed the rate of
growth in real per capita GDP by 1.25 percent, about the 
historical average over the past 20 years. For long-term care,
we assume that real age-adjusted per capita costs will grow at
the same rate as real per capita GDP.8 The CSIS projections are
consistent with recent projections by the OECD.9
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6 The 2003 Actuarial Estimates of the NPS and Its Reform Proposal  (in Korean) (National Pension Development Committee; 2003).
7 Hyungpyo Moon, “Population Aging and Sustainability of the National Pension System,” paper presented at the East-West Center and Korea Development Institute’s Conference on
Social Policy at a Crossroad: Trends in Advanced Countries and Implications for Korea (Honolulu; July 20-21, 2006).
8 Historical data on public health-care spending are from OECD Health Data 2006 (OECD; 2006). Public health-care spending on the elderly in the base year was derived from total
public health-care spending based on age-specific spending data in Soonman Kwon, “Aging and Health Policy in Korea,” paper presented at the 2006 East-West Center and Korea
Development Institute’s Conference on Social Policy at a Crossroad: Trends in Advanced Countries and Implications for Korea (Honolulu; July 20-21, 2006).
9 “Projecting OECD Health and Long-Term Care Expenditures: What are the Main Drivers?” OECD Economic Department Working Papers no. 477 (2006).
Choi (2006) = Unpublished projection data provided by 
Dr. Joonook Choi, Director of the Public Finance Research
Division at the Korea Institute of Public Finance.
Chung (2005) = Kyunghee Chung, “The 2004 Survey on the
Living Profile and Welfare Service Needs of Older Persons:
Results and Policy Implications,” (in Korean) Health and
Welfare Forum (Korea Institute for Health and Social Affairs;
March 2005).
Kim (2006) = Taihun Kim, “Population Size and Structure,” 
(in Korean) Statistics (Korean Statistical Association; 2006).
KNSO (2004) = Doosub Kim and Cheongseok Kim eds., The
Population of Korea (Korea National Statistical Office; 2004).
KNSO (2006) = Population Projections for Korea: 2005-2050
(in Korean) (KNSO; November 2006); and KNSO, Korean
Statistical Information System (KOSIS), online at
http://kosis.nso.go.kr/.
KNSO (various years) = KNSO, Korean Statistical Information
System (KOSIS), online at http://kosis.nso.go.kr/.
Kwon (2003) = Taihwan Kwon, “The Transformation 
of Korean Life: Demographic Trends and their Social
Implications,” Social Indicators Research, vol. 62, 
no. 1 (April 2003).
Kwon (2005) = Byoungku Kwon, The Role of the Financial
Industry in the Successful Establishment of the Corporate
Pension (in Korean) (Samsung Life Insurance; July 20, 2005).
Lee (2004) = Seunghyuk Lee, Strategic Agenda for Financial
Institutions for the Successful Introduction of the Corporate
Pension (in Korean) (IBM Korea; December 2004).
MOL (2005) = 2005 Labor Statistics Yearbook (Ministry of
Labor; November 2005).
MOL (2006) = “Monthly Labor Statistics,” (in Korean) (Ministry
of Labor; December 2006), online at http://molab.go.kr/.
Moon (2006) = Hyungpyo Moon, “Population Aging 
and Sustainability of the National Pension System,” paper 
presented at the East-West Center and Korea Development
Institute’s Conference on Social Policy at a Crossroad: Trends 
in Advanced Countries and Implications for Korea (Honolulu;
July 20-21, 2006).
NJC (2006) = Background material prepared for the Meetings
of the National Joint Convention for Low Fertility and Aging
Policy Agenda (Seoul; October 20-21, 2006).
NPDC (2003) = The 2003 Actuarial Estimates of the NPS 
and Its Reform Proposal (in Korean) (National Pension
Development Committee; 2003).
NPS (2006) = National Pension Statistical Yearbook 2005
(National Pension Service; May 2006).
NPS (2007) = National Pension Service, “National Pension
Scheme in Korea,” online at 
http://www.nps4u.or.kr/eng/g-index.html/.
UN (2005) = World Population Prospects: The 2004 Revision,
2 volumes (UN Population Division, 2005).
U.S. Census Bureau (2006) = U.S. Census Bureau, International
Data Base (IDB), online at 
http://www.census.gov/ipc/www/idbnew.html/.
Yoo (2005) = Kyeongwon Yoo, “Empirical Analysis of
Precautionary Portfolio Allocation: Evidence for Korea,” Bank
of Korea Economic Papers vol. 8, no. 1 (September 2005).
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